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1. INTRODUCTION 
Water quality concerns in the United States grow with every passing year, particu­
larly in the Midwest. From the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico to fish kills, drinking 
water concerns, and diminished recreational opportunities in the corn belt, society is 
concerned about the quality of its water. While industrial and municipal point sources 
of pollution are quite well-regulated, nonpoint or diffuse sources, among them agricul­
tural sources, are not. It is from this latter source that many of the existing problems 
originate. 
Agriculture contributes to water quality problems by its use of fertilizers in the crop 
production process. Of the common fertilizer components, nitrogen and phosphorus are 
the major nonpoint contributors to impaired waters through most of the United States 
[58]. Excessive nitrate in drinking water can result in "blue baby" syndrome which can 
be dangerous or life-threatening to infants and is also suspected as a contributing factor 
to some forms of cancer. High concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus in water leads 
to growth of algae. This detracts from recreational use of lakes and streams, causes 
unpleasant odors when the algae decay and consumes dissolved oxygen in water. The 
latter result has been linked to the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Public policy has yet to effectively address concerns related to nonpoint source pol­
lution. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has attempted to introduce 
water quality standards by the establishment of Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs). 
A TMDL is not accompanied by any pollution-reducing action or policy; currently the 
process of identifying and cataloging impaired waters is under way, albeit slowly. 
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Individual states are charged with the responsibility for identifying TMDLs in their 
watersheds. For each pollutant that results in a body of water failing to meet state 
water quality standards, the state is required to conduct a TMDL study. In addition 
to establishing a pollutant loading maximum, a TMDL assigns the amount of pollution 
that can be contributed by the sources of each pollutant and identifies both point and 
nonpoint sources. A water body (lake, stream, river) can have several TMDLs, each 
related to a specific pollutant. This process is ongoing and many states have long lists 
of water bodies without TMDLs but which are seriously impaired. 
Once a TMDL has been established, there is still the problem of meeting the stan­
dard. States and the federal government are both struggling to find the means to achieve 
changes in pollution discharge that can allow compliance with established TMDLs. The 
slow pace and many of the difficulties associated with policy implementation arise from 
from the need for solutions tailored to a specific area or watershed. This aspect of the 
problem is most acute in areas where a large proportion of water body impairment is due 
to nonpoint sources of pollution. Many factors affect the transport of nonpoint source 
pollution: topography, weather, land use or management, vegetation, among others. 
Each area has a singular combination of these factors and thus a unique contribution of 
nonpoint source pollutants to the water quality problems that are experienced. 
The Raccoon watershed in central Iowa is typical of many Midwestern watersheds. 
Much of its surface area is used for row crop production, largely in a corn-soybean crop 
rotation. Nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer are applied at relatively high levels on the 
corn crop and constitute the primary nonpoint nutrient pollutant source in the water­
shed. A map of its general location appears in Figure 1.1 and a graphical representation 
of land use in the watershed can be found in Figure 1.2. 
In the Raccoon watershed there are some small point sources in the form of municipal 
wastewater treatment facilities, a natural gas producer and a meat packing plant, but 
their contribution to nutrient loads is extremely small and as point sources they are 
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Figure 1.1 Location of the Raccoon watershed within the state of Iowa 
already regulated. 
There are two general water quality issues important to those affected by nutrient 
levels in the Raccoon watershed. One is nitrate levels at the Des Moines Water Works 
(DMWW). The DMWW provides drinking water for the Des Moines metro area, a 
population of nearly one-half million. It draws water from three sources: the Raccoon 
River, the Des Moines River and an infiltration gallery. In 1990 the DMWW invested 
in a nitrate-removal system in response to nitrate levels that exceeded drinking water 
standards. The DMWW activates this nitrate removal facility during periods of possible 
nitrate level increases. The costs of permanently removing nitrate from the water are 
much larger than the cost of disposal, so the removed nitrate is reintroduced to the river 
downstream from the DMWW. From there it continues on to the Mississippi river and 
eventually to the Gulf of Mexico. The facility cost $3.7 million to construct in 1990 and 
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Figure 1.2 Major land uses in the Raccoon watershed (Iowa DNR) 
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runs on average 45 days per year. Average treatment volume on those days is 10 million 
gallons which incurs approximately $3,000 in operating costs, suggesting a rough annual 
operating cost of $135,000. This figure does not include cost associated with disposal of 
scrubbed nitrate (the nitrate is simply returned to the river and continues downstream) 
nor does it take into account capital costs. 
Another important consideration in the impact of water quality degradation are the 
recreational activities to which the watershed area is host. Phosphorus is the limiting 
factor in the excess growth of algae that is visually unappealing, results in offensive 
odors, creates hypoxic or anoxic conditions leading to fish kills, and can contribute to 
dangerous levels of toxic cyanobacteria (similar to a freshwater "red tide"). Given these 
effects, phosphorus levels are a strong indicator of local freshwater quality. The Raccoon 
watershed contains nine lakes that offer significant recreational opportunities but which 
vary widely in water quality. For this reason, the impact of agricultural phosphorus 
use is an important factor in the quality of recreational opportunities available in the 
watershed. 
1.1 Nutrients and Crop Yield 
Studies addressing crop response to nitrogen and phosphorus input often report farm­
ers applying amounts of these nutrients that exceed profit-maximizing levels [63], or 
simply make the assumption that farmers apply at levels considered excessive when 
compared to a crop's nutrient intake or requirements [22], [1]. Application of nutrients 
in excess of the crop's biological needs results in these nutrients entering waterways 
through runoff during rainfall, leading to the water quality problems discussed above. 
The behavioral reason for over-application is often not made explicit, but there is 
some work that incorportes risk-averting behavior in application decisions—a discussion 
of several papers on this subject appears in Chapter 2. However, most evidence indicates 
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that higher input levels tend to increase the variance of yield, making risk-aversion an 
unlikely candidate to explain this over application. Risk neutrality with uncertainty 
regarding the effects of input choice can provide a reasonable explanation for observed 
nutrient application levels without imposing this type of structure. 
1.2 Methodology 
The overall goal of this study is to develop a framework for assessing policies designed 
to improve water quality in a given watershed; here, the Raccoon River watershed. Policy 
assessment will be in the form of water quality improvement and economic impact on 
farm operators. These policies include a tax on each nutrient, a per-acre application cap, 
a cap-and-trade application right trading scheme and a uniform reduction in application 
levels. There are two primary objectives that must be met in order to construct a fully 
coupled economic and water quality model to serve as the assessment framework. 
The first objective is the construction of a production model that captures the farm-
level nutrient application decision. To this end, a micro-econometric field-scale model 
of nutrient application (nitrogen and phosphorus) is estimated using a Just-Pope style 
production function in conjunction with six years of USDA Agricultural Resource Man­
agement Survey (ARMS) data. This detailed field-level data set is combined with prices 
and spatially detailed soil data to provide the necessary inputs for econometric estima­
tion. Predicted economic and behavioral outcomes of simulated policy scenarios at the 
farm level are integrated over the watershed area by linking the model results to the 
National Resources Inventory (NRI) data. 
The second objective is the setup and calibration of a physical model that will predict 
the fate and transport of nutrients that are applied. Those that are not taken up by 
the crop find their way to waterways and have a detrimental impact on water quality 
as discussed above. The final output from the production model is interfaced with the 
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Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) which is then used to determine the changes 
in water quality that would result under each policy. 
1.3 Overview 
The next chapter presents a review of literature from three perspectives: economic 
studies focusing on nonpoint source issues relevant to the discussion in this paper, stud­
ies that develop or employ stochastic production functions and studies that specifically 
apply the physical model used here to an economic problem. Chapter 3 describes the de­
velopment of the theoretical model employed and its application to the overall analysis. 
Chapter 4 provides an explanation of the estimation procedure used to fit the theoretical 
model as well as detailed explanations of the various data sets used in the estimation. 
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the physical water quality model used to simulate policy 
outcomes, background information on the watershed chosen for this study, and base­
line water quality data for the watershed outlet. Chapter 6 catalogs the results of the 
simulations based on the entire menu of policy scenarios, and Chapter 7 concludes with 
a review of the results and discussion of the implications for policy choice, as well as 
directions for future research. 
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The analysis on which this paper embarks relates to three general categories of litera­
ture. First, at its most basic level, it contributes to the broad body of work on regulation 
of nonpoint source pollution; more specifically those studies examining pollution that is 
a byproduct of agriculture. Secondly it addresses the importance of the mechanics of the 
analysis and the model used to support the methods utilized. For the economic model 
of Chapter 3 this means studies that utilize models incorporating risk into production 
processes and decisions. The third category deals with the water quality model described 
in Chapter 5 which is relatively new to the economics literature. The model itself has 
been put to use in many settings and the results of these modeling efforts appear in the 
literature of several physical science disciplines. 
This chapter will summarize several important papers that represent the three cate­
gories described above. Section 2.2 chooses from a broad array of nonpoint source work 
in economics. Section 2.3 contains a discussion of the modeling of production with risk 
that is endogenous to inputs. Finally, Section 2.4 highlights work that applies the water 
quality model used in this paper jointly with economic evaluation. 
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2.2 Nonpoint Source Literature 
The economics literature has much to say in addressing the problem of diffuse or non-
point source pollution. One can read about a myriad of theories explaining production 
processes as they relate to diffuse pollution and its abatement. There are also dozens 
of unique and creative policy analyses, some with simulations of the possible effects on 
water quality, production, and other variables of interest. 
With few exceptions, these studies focus on runoff or leaching from agricultural 
fields. Within this area itself most are concerned with nutrient loading in either surface 
or ground water, with some small mention of pesticides. This section seeks to provide 
an overview of the body of literature pertaining to nonpoint source pollution resulting 
from agricultural production. 
While there is certainly significant overlap in subject within the literature, the fol­
lowing sections will present the material by organizing studies into three categories. The 
first, and longest of these gives an overview of different means suggested to control non-
point agricultural pollution. The second section details several studies that integrate 
economic models suggested in the first section with physical simulation models to gauge 
the possible effectiveness and efficiency of one or more policies. The final section takes 
a brief look at some more quantitative work that has focused on single watersheds and 
the management of nonpoint pollution within them. 
2.2.1 Pollution Control Policies 
Given the length and conceptual breadth of this section, presentation is simplified by 
further subdividing articles into categories. They are somewhat loosely organized into: 
(i) A section discussing some background theory and the use of ambient taxes, (ii) A 
collection of studies which concentrate on a particular policy instrument or combination 
of instruments, and (iii) Synopses of selected papers that focus on trading of pollution 
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rights as a policy. 
Theory, Background, Ambient Taxes 
Griffin and Bromley [16] were among the earliest to formally develop the theoretical 
underpinnings of a model which analyzes agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality. 
The motivation for this paper is the need for a theoretical base with which to examine 
problems related to nonpoint source pollution. 
The authors identify three categories of nonpoint runoff issues. The first is that 
sediment, nutrient, and chemical removal are losses of production resources. These 
losses are costs borne by farmers. The second is a temporal externality that can exist 
when the discount rate of the farmer differs from that of society; this can result in the 
soil being "mined" too quickly. The third and final category is a spatial externality— 
the lost resources from runoff create pollution, with water being the primary transport 
mechanism. The bulk of the paper is devoted to developing theory and research methods 
to aid in developing policies to ameliorate these problems. Only the spatial type of 
externality is considered. 
One key element to the discussion is that the authors assume it is either impossible or 
too costly to measure the marginal benefits of pollution reduction. Instead, they assume 
that there is some sort of benchmark or standard in place that stands in as a proxy for 
a given desirable level of benefits. This type of assumption is common throughout the 
literature. 
The policy-relevant conclusions drawn are summarized in four suggestions for pol­
icy implementation. The first is what the authors term "nonpoint incentives," where 
emission determinants (inputs and/or outputs) are monitored. Examples of this might 
include input or effluent taxes. The second is a nonpoint "standard" where production 
activities are monitored. This would correspond to the concept of best management 
practice adoption. Along similar lines, the third policy suggestion is a set of indi­
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vidual management incentives for all production activities that produce pollution as a 
byproduct. The final suggestion is a system of standards that is dual to the individual 
management incentives. 
These policy options and the general ideas presented appear in much of the work in 
this area. What is not explicity addressed is the means by which pollution can actually 
be measured in order to implement policy. A significant amount of work has been done 
under the assumption that an ambient level of pollutant serves as a guide in this sort of 
decision. 
Segerson [52] outlines such an ambient-based system; taxes and bonuses designed 
to control nonpoint pollution in a watershed. Since the relationship between pollution 
discharge and ambient levels of pollution are stochastic and unobservable, the penalties 
and bonuses are applied to each contributing polluter in the watershed. The range of 
ambient pollution levels is represented by a probability distribution that is conditional on 
abatement practices undertaken by the polluters. The objective of the policy described is 
to increase the probability that the ambient pollution level falls below a chosen threshold 
value or standard. 
In the event that the pollution level exceeds the threshold value, a tax is imposed on 
all nonpoint sources. This tax includes a fixed component in addition to an amount based 
on the ambient level's deviation from the standard. Thus there is an assured minimum 
penalty once the threshold is passed. It is not specified if these taxes and payments 
are made on a continuous time basis or only in the event of the ambient level crossing 
the threshold in either direction. In essence, polluters "gamble" on their tax liability in 
weighing the possible taxation from polluting versus the costs of abatement. Under a 
standard set of assumptions, this scheme can result in a socially optimal outcome but 
requires that the regulators have detailed information about each polluter. 
Horan, et al. [20] build on previous work examining the use of ambient taxes in a 
nonpoint source setting. After a brief discussion on the lack of nonpoint source appli-
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cations from the emissions-based incentives literature, they discuss the limitations of 
previously analyzed ambient-based schemes. 
The authors begin with Segerson's idea of taxes based on ambient pollution levels, 
but expand the choice set available to the firm. Previous studies in both the emissions-
based and nonpoint source arenas concentrate on a one-dimensional choice simply rep­
resenting abatement. The particular characteristics in the example model are inputs, 
environmental drivers and multidimensional site characteristics. 
Given that firms have more than a one-dimensional choice set, they show that a linear 
ambient tax that is state independent (a la Segerson) can only achieve efficiency under 
singular conditions. To overcome this limitation two alternative schemes are developed 
to overcome the shortcomings of a simple linear state-independent tax. One is based on 
Segerson's linear design with a tax rate determined ex post along with the ambient tax 
base. The other is a nonlinear ambient tax. 
Xepapadeas [62] expands the subject of ambient pollution taxes to a dynamic setting. 
As was done in previous work, moral hazard problems are overcome by imposing taxes 
or subsidies on ambient pollution level deviation from a target. The framework of the 
model is an infinite-duration dynamic game. The process and effect of pollution itself 
has both dynamic and stochastic characteristics. 
The incentive system involves the levying of charges based on deviation of pollution 
levels from a target or standard. Charges would be levied apparently instantaneously 
though it is unclear how this might specifically be implemented. The optimal taxes 
depend on assumptions make about firm/polluter strategy. If polluters follow a feedback 
strategy where they condition their emission choice based on current ambient levels, the 
required taxes are higher than they would be if the polluters have open-loop strategies. 
The charges imposed on polluters are dependent on the marginal cost of the pollution, 
the discount rate and a physical decay rate attributed to the pollutant stock. Damages 
depend on the time path of the pollution stock. This is essentially a dynamic version of 
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the static model suggested by Segerson. Since the solutions are different, the implication 
is made that using the static version in a dynamic world is suboptimal. 
Although ambient taxes may be of theoretical interest, they are not considered fea­
sible in empirical studies or actual policy implementation. Most of the more recent 
literature concentrates on other means of nonpoint source pollution control, such as 
those suggested by Griffin and Bromley, among others. These will be discussed in the 
subsection covering policy instruments. 
In a unique exception that re-examines a basic theoretical assumption, Millock, et 
al. [40] take a novel approach to the nonpoint source pollution problem. They contend 
that the distinction between a point source and a nonpoint source exists only due to the 
cost of monitoring. That is, any pollution source can become a point source at the cost 
of acquiring sufficient monitoring technology. 
The model introduced makes use of a costly monitoring technology which could take 
the form of physical monitoring equipment or a system of random site audits. Pollution 
as a part of the production process is considered under two externality cases. First, the 
case of an output externality where pollution is a unavoidable result of production and 
second, a residue externality in which case a waste of input or inputs is the cause of 
pollution. 
The authors consider three different policy scenarios and seek to determine the op­
timal level of monitoring and taxation under each. In one, monitoring is considered 
unavailable (or available at an infinite price). In the second, monitoring is mandatory 
for all potential polluters, while the third considers voluntary adoption with incentives. 
The results of the analysis suggest that in the presence of monitoring costs no level of 
pollution is optimal; the regulator must trade off monitoring costs for input allocation 
efficiency. 
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Policy Instruments 
There are several types of policy instruments typically examined in nonpoint pollu­
tion abatement studies. Focus is usually on influencing either the level of input (e.g., 
fertilizer) used in production, the technology or practices used in production (e.g., tillage 
method), or a combination of the two. Many studies are comparative, assessing the rela­
tive costs of two policies given a benchmark or target for pollutant level. This subsection 
will outline the methods and results of several such studies. 
Jacobs and Casier [27] examine the social cost of implementing two nonpoint source 
pollution abatement policies. Effluent taxes are compared to uniform treatment or reduc­
tion. They note several previous arguments favoring effluent taxes as a policy instrument 
and come to similar conclusions in their empirical analysis of efficiency. However, their 
goal is to look at the distributional effects of the two policies. 
Focusing on phosphorus discharge, the authors detail both the social costs and cost 
to farmers of reducing crop-production related phosphorus discharge into the Fall Creek 
watershed in central New York state. The analysis is conducted using an approximation 
of the proportion of phosphorus inputs entering the watershed and a linear programming 
model of agricultural production. Phosphorus reductions were modeled as shifts in crop 
rotations (e.g., substituting hay for corn). The net costs of these reductions are in the 
form of increased cost of purchasing feed from outside the area less the hay production 
cost differences as compared to corn. The results of the study indicate that effluent 
taxes have lower social costs, but incur a greater cost to farmers, raising questions about 
political acceptance and equity issues involved in implementation. 
Cooper and Keim [11] study farmer adoption of a variety of water-quality-friendly 
land management practices. The practices are those identified by the USDA for the 
Water Quality Incentive Program (WQIP). The goals of the paper are to model the 
probability that a farmer not currently in the WQIP program adopts a practice (as 
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a function of the incentive payment available) and to determine the number of acres 
enrolled given that a farmer joins the program. 
The practices examined include integrated pest management, legume crediting, ma­
nure testing, split nitrogen application and soil moisture testing. Data is from the 1992 
Area Studies dataset and from a contingent valuation survey distributed to respondents 
sampled in the Area Studies data. Two econometric models are presented. One to es­
timate adoption (by non-adopters) of the best management practices for which WQIP 
is available, the other to estimate the number of acres put into each practice by current 
WQIP participants. 
The first model estimates farmers' willingness to accept payment in exchange for 
changing their land management methods. One problem the authors needed to overcome 
was the fact that the sample included only farmers who did not currently employ the 
practices in question. To deal with this, they estimated two sets of equations. The first 
models what they call the "sample selection" choice (whether or not a farmer actually 
participated in the WQIP) while the second models the "adoption" choice (the non-
participating farmers' answer to the contingent valuation question). 
A secondary goal of the research was to determine the acreage farmers might enroll 
in the practices. They were posed hypothetical questions about the amount of land they 
would choose to convert to using the WQIP practices. This is hampered by a potential 
source of bias because only those farmers answering affirmatively to the contingent 
valuation question were asked to complete the acreage enrollment section. To ameliorate 
this and the sample selection problem mentioned earlier, the authors devised a means 
of capturing all three relations in an extension of the Heckman procedure. 
The main thrust of this paper was to determine farmers' willingness to accept changes 
in their land management in exchange for payment. At the time, WQIP incentive levels 
were set without any knowledge of farmers' "conservation supply," so to speak. Through 
estimation of their model, the authors offer a solution to this inefficiency. They are able 
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to determine separate response relations for all five of the preferred practices. With this 
information, future programs may be better able to target levels of participation. 
Peterson and Boisvert [46] develop a model of voluntary farmer participation in a 
policy designed to reduce agricultural pollution. The structure of the model is applied to 
simulate the effects in New York state corn production, and the results used to evaluate 
policy alternatives. The pollutant of interest is nitrogen applied as fertilizer. 
Citing as motivation the lack of efficiency inherent in uniform policies, the authors 
proceed to outline a policy that allows abatement activities to vary by location. This is 
to be compared to a baseline or benchmark case of government command control, where 
individual regulations are assigned to each farmer. A predetermined emissions target 
is chosen to avoid the need to find the social cost of pollution. The goal is to design a 
self-selecting voluntary program that will achieve the same conditions as the baseline. 
The results show that the payments needed for a voluntary program exceed farmers' 
cost of pollution control, that is, there is an additional cost to self-selection. Although 
these costs reduce the efficiency of the policy, they must be weighed against the cost 
and intrusiveness of implementing a command and control type policy. In addition 
self-selection can occur if the most productive group pollutes the least. 
Khanna, et al. [36] compare the costs of several means of achieving a given level 
of pollution control. The pollution target is expressed in terms of expected levels, as 
regulations are assumed to only affect the deterministic portion of emissions. In addition 
to efficiency comparisons, the research also aims to examine the effect different policies 
have on agricultural production and consequently the amount of land under production. 
Comparisons are made based on numerical simulations. 
Specific issues under study are the cost-effectiveness of alternative green payments 
relative to a least-cost pollution tax and the effects of these payments on the scale of 
aggregate agricultural production. The policies considered for pollution abatement are 
cost-share subsidies for technology adoption, input-reduction subsidies, and a combina-
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tion of the two. In addition, two versions of each policy are analyzed: in one there are no 
restrictions on entry, whereas the other restricts participation to firms already operating 
at the time of policy implementation. 
A micro-level discrete choice model is developed for the analysis. Land quality is 
allowed to be heterogeneous, and both production and pollution functions are specific to 
soil type and production technology. Pollution reduction takes place through a switching 
effect, intensive/extensive margin effects, and/or exit from production. The policymaker 
knows the distribution of soil types, aggregate pollution and input use and/or technology 
choices. 
The numerical analysis is applied to irrigated cotton production in California's San 
Joaquin Valley. The input to be controlled is water and there are two types of irrigation 
technology, furrow and drip, with the latter being the costly conservation technology. 
The results indicate that a restricted combined green payment policy is the most efficient, 
and not far from the benchmark least-cost tax. The authors also found that most of the 
second-best policies under consideration were very close in efficiency to the benchmark. 
Trading 
In many ways, trading the right to emit a pollutant is just another policy tool. 
However, it has several unique characteristics that create issues not present with other 
methods of pollution control. A common topic is the choice of an optimal trading ratio, 
that is, the ratio at which nonpoint sources are allowed to generate pollution permits for 
point sources. There is also much discussion of implementation and monitoring issues. 
Malik, et al. [39] address some shortcomings of other point-nonpoint source trading 
schemes analyses. In particular, they take issue with two common assumptions. The 
first of these is the assumption that nonpoint source loadings are deterministic, the 
second the assumption that nonpoint sources only differ in abatement costs and loading 
effects. 
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The authors argue that current recommendations and implementation of point-
nonpoint source trading have established inefficient trading ratios. Ratio suggestions 
almost uniformly suggest that one point source unit pollution be equivalent to more 
than one nonpoint source unit. 
A model is developed to determine appropriate trading ratios and the conditions 
that influence the ratio. The nonpoint sources generate pollution reduction by adopting 
a costly technology and face enforcement via random audits. The model captures both 
the uncertainty in the effect of the nonpoint controls on ambient pollution levels and 
the random nature of pollution loading. 
The two types of uncertainty have independent effects on the optimal trading ratio; 
these effects can act in opposite directions. Ceteris paribus with respect to uncertainty, 
the curvature of the damage function determines the optimal ratio. Unfortunately, de­
termining the optimal ratio has very high information requirements-the regulator needs 
to know both the damage function and the point sources' marginal abatement costs. 
Horan [21] examines the issue of point/nonpoint source emissions trading. The goal 
of the article is to look at program design options in order to overcome problems in new 
and existing trading systems (e.g., low trade activity). Focus is on the choice of trading 
ratio, i.e., the rate at which nonpoint source abatement activities are allowed to generate 
excess permits for sale to point sources. 
Expected nonpoint source pollution loadings are imperfect substitutes for point 
source loadings, so there is no basis for choosing a ratio of 1:1. Existing trading programs 
all have a ratio that exceeds this, ranging from 1.3:1 to 3:1. These ratios are usually 
justified by appealing to the existence of uncertainty associated with nonpoint source 
controls. 
The author argues that there is a case for trading ratios below 1:1 based on eco­
nomic theory. For a risk-averse society it would be important to have a lower ratio to 
encourage more nonpoint source reductions. The explanation for the current situation is 
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that trading ratios as they exist now are designed to be politically optimal rather than 
economically optimal. 
Via a political-economic model, the article goes into greater depth with regards to 
the issue of political/economic optimality, showing how differences in optimal trading 
ratios are due to risk perceptions. 
Johansson (2002) [29] examines information asymmetries in the context of a point/nonpoint 
source trading scheme. In the framework presented, farmers misrepresent their abate­
ment efforts when generating point source emission permits. This occurs due to imperfect 
but costly monitoring. The monitoring costs reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policies. 
The trading policies considered are compared empirically using simulations in a 
phosphorus-impaired watershed in southern Minnesota. Watershed data is used to esti­
mate cost and benefit functions for restrictions on phosphorus discharge, and the policies 
are then evaluated in terms of realized social welfare. The results indicate that second-
best policies can outperform first-best policies given that monitoring is costly. The 
analysis also shows that in the context of this model and watershed, trading programs 
significantly outperform uniform performance standards. 
2.2.2 Physical Model Integration and Meta-modeling 
While theory and consideration of policy options are essential, it is also important 
that realistic outcomes of policy be examined. For this reason many studies have paired 
physical models of pollution transport and concentration with economic policy models. 
In order to generate the types of inputs necessary for this sort of analysis, many re­
searchers must rely on simulations from physical process models to build their economic 
models.1 These can be very useful tools for policy evaluation and give a degree of realism 
to an analysis. 
1This is an example of using one model to estimate a separate economic model, or meta-modeling. 
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Helfand and House [19] consider the application of second-best policy instruments 
to encourage pollution abatement. The case is made in favor of these instruments over 
optimal instruments due to the latter's near-impossibility of implementation on any 
appreciable scale. The analysis proceeds in the context of a case study involving crop 
production in California. The pollutant is nitrate levels in groundwater. 
The authors' primary goal is to tabulate and compare the cost effects of input taxes 
and a required input "rollback;" combinations of these over the two inputs (water and 
nitrogen fertilizer) are considered. By varying input levels, the Erosion/Productivity 
Impact Calculator (EPIC) physical model is used to generate "data" correlating input 
use, crop yields and pollution. Heterogeneity in soil type also exists, with one soil type 
being more productive in the sense of requiring fewer of both inputs. The less productive 
soil tends to leach more nitrogen in addition to increased input needs for similar yields. 
The policy target was a 20% reduction in ambient nitrate levels in groundwater. Six 
uniform policies were considered: a uniform rollback on nitrogen application, a uniform 
tax on both inputs, a single tax on each of two inputs separately and an input application 
standard enforced on each of two inputs separately. The physical effects of policy were 
also evaluated using EPIC. 
As a benchmark, the authors calculated the costs of implementing a first-best set of 
taxes on both inputs that varies by soil type. Three of the six second-best policies were 
very close (within 3%) to that benchmark in terms of costs, suggesting that uniform 
policies similar to those considered do not give up much in terms of efficiency. 
Larson, et al. [37] present essentially the same model as Helfand and House with a 
more general theoretical development. Beginning with a field-level model, they deter­
mine conditions for the smallest deadweight loss tax policy that meets an environmental 
standard. 
Citing jurisdictional difficulties in applying taxes to multiple inputs, the authors 
proceed with an examination of taxes on a single input. For the application, area and 
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crop they find that the most efficient single tax policy is a water tax. The welfare cost 
of a water tax is not large, especially when compared to a nitrogen-only tax. 
Vatn, et al. [59] introduce a large and complex interdisciplinary environmental mod­
eling system. In terms of economic analysis, the model's ultimate purpose is to compare 
the effects of input policies with those of practice-change policies. Owing to the scale of 
the overall model, the study is able to cover nitrogen leaching, soil loss and phosphorus 
loss via simulation of simultaneous loss-creating processes. 
The authors argue that modeling multiple effects of pollutants is important, espe­
cially at lower pollution levels, and that changes in practices also have effects that should 
be modeled integrally. In the particular case of phosphorus, they suggest that plant cover 
and tillage practices may be more important than nutrient input/output relationships. 
Application of the integrated model in Norway indicates that catch- crop scenarios 
are the only policies with a substantial effect on combined nutrient loadings. Outside 
of this result, a nitrogen tax was found to be effective on emissions in areas with dairy 
production. 
Ribaudo, et al. [51] examine the problem of nitrogen loading reductions in the Mis­
sissippi river basin and the resultant hypoxic conditions in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
analysis includes a comparison of the cost effectiveness of two approaches: fertilizer use 
reductions and wetland restoration. Of particular concern to the authors are larger 
economic effects outside of the policy region, e.g., commodity prices, agricultural pro­
duction, erosion, et cetera. 
The U.S. Agricultural Sector Mathematical Programming (USMP) model is used 
to evaluate market changes due to policy imposition. A spatial and market equilibrium 
model, it predicts how changes in farm/resource/environmental/trade policy, commodity 
demand, and technology will affect the supply of agricultural output, commodity prices, 
and use of agricultural inputs. 
Nitrogen reduction scenarios of 10% through 60% are compared to wetland restora­
22 
tion scenarios of varying scale. The USMP model is used to trace out the social marginal 
cost for each policy. The authors find that for lower levels of nitrogen loss reduction, 
mandating a decrease in fertilizer use is superior to wetland restoration. However, above 
a certain level of nitrogen loss reduction, wetland reduction is predicted to be the more 
efficient means of achieving a particular goal. Unfortunately, the paper did not address 
scenarios involving combinations of the two policy types. 
Johansson (2004) [30] assembles a modeling system that combines heterogeneous 
productivity and nutrient loading potential in agricultural land. Using a meta-model and 
frontier analysis, phosphorus abatement costs are constructed for farms. The resulting 
system is used to evaluate policies aimed at reducing phosphorus discharge by 40% in a 
Minnesota watershed. 
The physical model used to generate nutrient loads and crop yields is the Agricultural 
Drainage And Pesticide Transport (ADAPT) model, which uses as inputs crop choice, 
residue management, fertilizer application, and weather variables. The watershed itself 
is separated into 18 "representative farms" which are land-type areas delineated by nine 
soil types with two location categories each; the categories are based on the farm's 
distance from a waterway. 
Production on each farm/unit is simulated over 14 different combinations of practices 
(practices vary by crop rotation, tillage, and fertilizer application method and level) over 
a 50-year period. For each combination, abatement relative to a baseline practice set is 
calculated, as is the cost differential for practice changes from the baseline. To achieve 
in-stream loading estimates, a simple sediment delivery rate (proportion of applied phos­
phorus reaching the waterway) is used, one for each location category. 
The policy objective is a 40% reduction in in-stream phosphorus loading. Four 
scenarios are considered: a percentage uniform reduction by each unit, retirement of 
land beginning with the least productive, retirement of land beginning with the most 
phosphorus loading potential, and heterogeneous abatement levels at each unit to achieve 
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reduction at the lowest cost. Compared to the lowest cost scenario, the uniform reduction 
is next in cost, followed by highest loading potential and then lowest productivity land 
retirement. The suggestion is made that under the Conservation Reserve Program it 
may be most efficient to target land with high phosphorus loading potential before less-
productive land. 
2.2.3 Watershed Case Studies and other work 
Physical models can provide excellent flexibility and are very attractive from an 
analytical point of view, but it is also important to work with more real, concrete 
evidence of policy effects. Some of this type of work is retrospective, while others 
are recommendations for future policy based on observations and measurements. It is 
also illuminating to look at case studies that, while not utilizing advanced modeling 
techniques, provide the details of specific water quality impairment in a region. Site-
specific information and predictions are crucial to the success of any program seeking to 
ameliorate problems caused by nonpoint source pollution. 
Johnsen [31] makes use of actual field experiment data and enumerates several means 
of producing reductions in phosphorus loading in waterways, concentrating on agricul­
tural production in Norway. He considers two categories of phosphorus abatement: 
reductions in levels of erosion and reductions in the amount of phosphorus available for 
runoff. This can occur through a variety of measures and practices. 
The abatement measures discussed are a fertilizer plan requirement, a tax on phos­
phorus content, manure timing restrictions, contouring, grassed waterways, tillage re­
strictions, and land retirement (cropland to woodland). The phosphorus-abating effects 
of each measure are based on either field-experiment-based models or direct field exper­
iments conducted over the course of four years in several Norwegian sites. 
Economic data comes from a national survey of farmers and the analysis appears to 
be essentially an accounting of costs of practice changes. The author concludes with 
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recommendations for future policy, including a very large (150%) tax on phosphorus 
inputs, a ban on manure spreading outside of the growing season and a ban on fall 
tillage. 
"Fox-Wolf Basin 2000," a non-profit group of watershed stakeholders in Wisconsin's 
Fox-Wolf River Basin, commissioned a report from Resource Strategies, Inc. [50] to ex­
plore the possibilities for reducing the level of phosphorus within the watershed. The 
goal of the project is to assess the effects of a point-nonpoint source trading program in 
the presence of an increased effluent phosphorus standard for point sources. Compliance 
cost surveys were sent to all point sources, with a favorable response rate from munic­
ipal waste treatment plants but only one response from the numerous industrial point 
sources. Because of this, the latter are excluded from the study. Nonpoint sources in the 
watershed include agricultural operations and urban storm water runoff. However, due 
to the paucity of data on urban runoff and agriculture's large phosphorus contribution, 
only changes in agricultural practices are considered as a means of reducing surplus 
phosphorus. 
Thirteen municipal wastewater treatment plants provided abatement cost estimates, 
accounting for nearly 84% of the phosphorus delivered to the basin by treatment plants. 
It is noted that these are internal estimates, in some cases quite rough approximations. 
The cost estimates vary from as low as $l/lb. of phosphorus reduction to $500/lb. This 
large variance alone suggests that there could be a significant role for point-point source 
trading if a new standard were to be imposed. 
Two types of phosphorus-reducing practices are used in cost calculations for agricul­
tural operations. One, termed "upland sediment measures" includes varying degrees of 
conservation tillage, alternative crop rotations and buffer strips. The second, "barnyard 
practices," is made up of clean water diversions, concrete barnyards and manure storage 
pits. 
County watershed technicians working for land conservation departments were sur-
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veyed to provide cost estimates for the best management practices identified. They 
selected a number of operations from their respective areas which are believed to have 
good potential for reducing phosphorus output by changes in management practices, but 
which are also not participating in a state-sponsored cost sharing program for green im­
provements. For practices which are already subsidized by the state (conservation tillage 
and nutrient management) calculations are based on the actual payments available. In 
addition to the costs of encouraging changes in land management, estimates of adminis­
trative costs are also elicited. These cover a huge range, from $60 to $800 per operation 
to assess possible gains in phosphorus reduction and the means to achieve them. The 
estimated control costs themselves are between $3/lb. to $117/lb. of phosphorus, with 
an average cost of approximately $26/lb. 
Dramatic differences in abatement costs across the two types of polluters indicates 
a welcome role for trading. Due to the fact that the pollution is not uniformly mixed, 
it will likely be necessary to divide the basin into three trading areas: the Upper Fox, 
Lower Fox and Wolf basins. Unfortunately, when the numbers for subdivisions of the 
basin are examined, only the Lower Fox displays a significant disparity in control costs 
between point and nonpoint sources. While trading may still be possible in the other 
two basins, there could be problems encouraging all parties to participate. 
This report only considers scenarios in which point sources pay for reductions in 
agricultural contributions in order to exceed imposed emission limits. It would be very 
interesting to consider policies where restrictions are imposed on agricultural practices 
and farmers allowed to trade amongst themselves or - even buy the privilege to pollute 
from point sources who are under-emitting. As evidence shows that farmers are the 
primary polluters in this and other watersheds, it is more efficient if they face controls 
similar to those imposed on point source polluters. 
Parker [45] presents an overview of Maryland's 1998 Water Quality Improvement Act 
and its effects on the agricultural sector in the Chesapeake Bay area. The regulations put 
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in place are possibly the most restrictive nonpoint source pollution laws in the country. 
A goal of the paper is to look at the distributional effects of this policy. 
The genesis for the new law was a summer 1997 explosion in growth of a microbe that 
resulted in fish kills and health problems for humans exposed to the water in the bay. The 
reason for the large population of this microbe was a confluence of water temperature, 
salinity and an excess of phosphorus. Producers contributing to the phosphorus problem 
are poultry producers and crop growers in the area. The latter acquire manure from the 
former to apply to their fields, and likely were applying all that was available. 
The new regulations require crop growers to have and implement nutrient manage­
ment plans. Poultry producers must account for and dispose of the excess that crop 
growers can no longer apply. Three means of manure disposal or "alternative use" are 
suggested: generate energy, compost, or transport it out of the area. 
Distribution of the policy effects is demonstrated to depend on the alternative use 
to which the manure is put. Composting and energy production both result in the costs 
being borne by poultry producers. The effect of transporting the manure outside the 
area is dependent on the strength of the poultry litter market, but is stated to be most 
likely in favor of crop growers. There are a few cost mitigation programs in place that will 
ameliorate or minimize the negative effects to either group affected by the regulations. 
While economics-related in nature, a report by Faeth [14] is essentially a summary 
of three case studies. It contains a very large amount of information, from a broad 
discussion of the history of pollution mitigation and the Clean Water Act to the minutiae 
of each watershed under study. The nutrient under study is phosphorus, the source of 
the most impairment in freshwater areas similar to the three watersheds in the study, 
located in Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. 
As a document aimed at a wide audience, the details of the economic and physical 
models used to conduct the analysis were not presented. There are a number of interest­
ing observations and questions generated by the investigation and discussion presented. 
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To begin with, a good case is made for the necessity of action to reduce nutrient load­
ings from their present level. The Michigan watershed (Saginaw Bay) adjoins the Great 
Lakes where 97% of the watersheds are considered impaired. 
Evidence is presented to demonstrate the considerable role agriculture plays in cur­
rent watershed impairment, and an inclusive list of the results of excess phosphorus: 
reduced water transparency, taste/odor/treatment problems, and oxygen depletion lead­
ing to fish kills and possible loss of desirable fish species. Compounding this is the fact 
that approximately 60% of the phosphorus used is not used by the crops on which it is 
applied. 
There is also a lengthy discussion of the contribution of animal manure to phosphorus 
loading. Of note from this section is that consumers' increased preferences for poultry 
over beef have led to greater phosphorus output due to avian waste having a higher 
concentration per unit than cattle manure. The author makes the observation that 
"wastes from animal operations ware not controlled with anywhere near the same rigor 
as human wastes, even though, in the United States, waste from livestock is about 130 
times greater than that from humans." 
In introducing the concepts and mechanics of point/nonpoint source trading, refer­
ence is made to closed trading programs which usually include a mandatory maximum 
emission level and open trading programs where participation is typically voluntary, with 
participants generating "credits" to be banked/traded/used to meet regulation limits. 
Several examples of pilot programs are cited; particularly interesting is the Tar-Pamlico 
Basin of North Carolina. There, a group of point sources trade among themselves to 
stay under a cap. If they must exceed the cap, they can pay into a fund supporting a 
program encouraging farmers in the watershed to adopt nutrient-reducing practices. 
An important benefit of a more balanced (vis-a-vis point and nonpoint sources) 
bearing of pollution mitigation responsibility could be substantial cost savings. The 
study indicates that reduced background pollution from agriculture could alleviate the 
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need for advanced (and more expensive) water treatment. EPA estimates a net savings 
of $15 billion in these advanced treatment costs. 
Although the particulars of the economic model were not described, an accounting of 
the menu of technologies allowed for both point and nonpoint emitters is provided. For 
point sources, there were six options for phosphorus output reduction: no treatment, 
standard chemical treatment, maximum chemical treatment, chemical removal with fil­
tration, biological removal, and biological removal with filtration. For nonpoint sources 
tillage was the dimension of choice with five possible plans: moldboard plow, conven­
tional till, mulch till, no-till, and ridge till. Only one choice dimension per emitter type 
appears to have been employed in the model. 
As a baseline for the different loading scenarios, a least cost (first best) solution was 
calculated, to which all of the scenarios could be compared. Four policy scenarios were 
considered: a point source performance requirement, subsidies for "greener" agricultural 
practices, a point source requirement with trading and a trading program with subsidies. 
In every case, increasing point source requirements was the highest-cost option, while 
a trading program with subsidies dominated the other three policies. This was uniformly 
the result across all three case studies. Cost of phosphorus reduction ranged from under 
$3/lb. to nearly $24/lb. in the worst case of a point source performance requirement. 
Obviously, tightening controls on point sources alone will be quite expensive. Absent 
are the particulars of how these trading markets would actually function. While it is 
understood that this is not a market simulation but rather a cost accounting exercise, 
there is a broad spectrum of issues that need to be addressed in comparing policy options. 
There are administrative and enforcement costs as well as the need for a location or 
clearinghouse for the market. Who or what can fill that role is an important question 
that remains un-addressed. Also missing is any mention of possibilities for nonpoint-
nonpoint trading; for example, a market where permits to apply phosphorus are traded 
only among nonpoint emitters. One could even envision a two-tiered emission standard, 
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one for point and one for nonpoint sources, chosen to optimize loading reductions per 
dollar in abatement costs. 
2.3 Stochastic Production 
The agricultural economics literature has given much attention to methods of pro­
duction estimation involving input-related risk. There are several approaches to the 
problem of modeling risk via stochastic production functions, falling into two general 
categories. The first category is those modeling efforts that specify a production relation 
with technology that captures some risk aspect. Simpler versions of this method only 
vary the mean effect on yield, while more recent and useful approaches allow input use 
to affect mean and variance of output. The second category contains non-parametric 
methods that model the moments of the production output distribution as functions of 
the inputs, with the goal of capturing aspects of the yield distribution 
2.3.1 Specified Technology 
A seminal paper on the subject of the first category is Just and Pope [34], in which the 
authors develop a production function that allows input use to affect both a deterministic 
and stochastic production component while eliminating some of the drawbacks of earlier 
models. This paper is a theoretical exploration of which features are desirable in a 
production function incorporating risk, and which production functions are appropriate 
given these features. In particular, the authors formulate eight postulates they feel 
should be satisfied for a production function to be useful and appropriate to this type 
of modeling. Several of these postulates are standard assumptions for deterministic 
production functions or correspond to deterministic assumptions. A brief summary of 
these postulates follows, using the authors' notation of y for production output, Xi for 
input i, and e for the stochastic disturbance with the general form of the production 
30 
relation y = f(X, s). 
1. Positive production expectations: E[y] > 0. 
2. Positive marginal product expectations: > 0. 
3. Diminishing marginal product expectations: adffl • 
4. A change in the variance for random components in production should not nec­
essarily imply a change in expected output when all production factors are held 
fixed: — O is possible. 
5. Increasing, decreasing, or constant marginal risk should all be possibilities: < 
or > 0 possible. 
6. A change in risk should not necessarily lead to a change in factor use for a risk-
neutral producer: Qy^ = 0 possible, where X* is the optimal level of input i. 
7. The change in the variance of marginal product with respect to a factor change 
should not be constrained in sign a priori without regard to the nature of the 
input: av<-ady^dx^ < or > 0 possible. 
8. Constant stochastic returns to scale should be possible: F(6X) = 9F(X) for scalar 
0. 
These eight postulates are used to evaluate and reject several production function spec­
ifications. An alternative to these is proposed, one which satisfies all of the postulates. 
This alternative makes use of an additively separate stochastic input-dependent function. 
The general form of this production function is 
y = f(X) + h{X)e, with E[e\ — 0 and V(e) = a. (2.1) 
where h(X) is the stochastic input-dependent function. 
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The remainder of the paper is concerned with econometric estimation of this style of 
production function. A four-step estimation procedure is suggested, as is a discussion 
of the consistency and efficiency of the resulting estimators. 
An application of the above stochastic production model approach appears in Just 
and Pope [35]; much of this paper reviews the theoretical discussion from Just and 
Pope [34] and applies it to the problem of modeling nitrogen fertilizer yield response in 
corn and oats. The estimation procedure is described in more detail and with reference 
to the chosen specification. 
Two alternate function forms for the model, a Cobb-Douglas and a translog function, 
are applied to the data. The data is from controlled experiments on corn and oat 
production; the dependent variable being per bushel yield and the independent variable 
is nitrogen fertilizer application. The experimental nature of the data allows other 
variables to be held constant across field plots. It is assumed that variability in effects 
from plot to plot are negligible due to their proximity. 
For both corn and oats, results from estimation of the Cobb-Douglas specification 
finds nitrogen fertilizer to be a risk-increasing input. Estimation results of the translog 
specification, however, indicate that the marginal effects of fertilizer on yield variability 
depend on the level of fertilizer rates. Also of note is that for both crops the elasticity 
for variability is lower than that for the mean. 
Anderson and Griffiths [2] make use of the modeling structure introduced by Just 
and Pope, applying it in a stochastic programming setting of efficient resource allocation 
under risk. They define the utility-maximization problem as a function of net financial 
return R, U(R): 
R = PyY — — F 
with Y as physical output, X; factor inputs, F fixed cost, and the p's denoting relevant 
prices; the latter are assumed nonstochastic and known. Under the assumption that the 
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expected utility can be expressed in terms of the mean and variance of R, the first order 
conditions for the optimum are laid out: 
OEM ^ ^y(y) 
P>-dX--red9P*-dX-=I" 
with redq measures the decision maker's trade off between mean and variance of returns. 
The authors choose a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion, the negative 
exponential: U(R) = — exp(-6R). They note the restrictive nature of this function, 
but cite its widespread use in both empirical and theoretical work, as well as some 
advantageous mathematical properties. 
Love and Buccola [38] use these same preferences in their study of corn production 
under risk. They develop a model in the Just-Pope framework that accomplishes an 
important goal: joint estimation of risk preferences and technology. Of key interest 
is the ability of this modeling approach to provide consistent estimates of both factor 
demand relations and the relationship between inputs and output. 
The authors choose a three-input Cobb-Douglas version of the model in equation (2.1), 
i.e. /(•) = AX^Xg2 and h(-) = BX\lX^. Using their chosen risk preferences (U(tt) = 
— exp(—Att)) and defining a profit function based on the technology specified, the farmer's 
optimization problem is constructed and first order conditions for its solution obtained. 
The structure of these conditions is such that closed-form solutions do not exist. This 
requires simultaneous estimation and some assumptions on the role of error terms in 
estimating these relations. The choice is made to append additive errors to the implic­
itly defined input demand relations, the assumption being that they represent random 
failures in optimization. In order to jointly estimate input demands and the produc­
tion relation, the heteroscedasticity inherent in the technology specification is removed 
through manipulation of the production relation. This causes slight complication in 
estimation and recovery of parameters but is necessary to ensure consistent estimates. 
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The model is estimated using a nonlinear three-stage least squares procedure on 
Iowa corn data from three regions with three fertilizer inputs (nitrogen, phosphorus, 
and potassium). The resulting estimates are compared to those obtained using a stan­
dard Just-Pope model and a distribution-based model from Nelson and Preckel [42] via 
yield elasticities of mean and standard deviation with respect to the inputs. There is 
significant variation in these results, particularly in the direction of input effects on 
yield variation. This suggests that risk effects are possibly more difficult to estimate 
accurately than mean effects. 
2.3.2 Moment-based Methods 
Antle (1983) [4] seeks to move beyond the restrictions placed on yield distribution 
modeling due to the specification of a production function. He presents a more ffexibile 
representation of stochastic technology that is based on the moments of the distribution 
of output. The goal is to allow modeling in which not only heteroscedasticity is possi­
ble, but also heteroskewness, heterokurtosis, and varying behavior in higher moments. 
Empirical evidence is presented that second, third, fourth, and higher moments may be 
functions of production inputs. 
The motivation behind this approach is that the probability distribution of output is 
a unique function of its moments, i.e., the moments are the determining characteristics of 
a distribution. Implicit in this is that the behavior of firms under stochastic production 
is defined by the relationship between inputs and output moments. 
The goal is to develop a production model that is completely general; that is, it does 
not impose arbitrary restrictions or structure on the moments as is done in models which 
specify a production technology. A drawback to this approach is that it focuses solely on 
stochastic structure and does not provide a useful means of working with deterministic 
components of production. Inputs do have an effect on output, but any specification of an 
input demand function would implicitly impose a production technology and represent 
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exactly the type of restriction this method seeks to avoid. 
A generalized least-squares method is used to obtain estimators of the moments; this 
is applied to a small milk production dataset. The results indicate that the first through 
third moments of production output are significant. 
In further discussion and application of the moment-based approach, Antle [5] uses 
non-experimental farm production data to estimate risk attitudes. The study assumes 
a stochastic profit distribution that is conditional on input levels, and a utility function 
dependent on profit and a vector of parameters representing individual risk attitudes. 
Moments of the profit distribution are assumed to be functions of the inputs, and 
a system of optimality conditions (first-order conditions for a maximum) is constructed 
based on this assumption and the addition of an additive error term. The latter is 
included to account for the approximate nature of the first-order conditions and to allow 
for random deviation from the optimal response. This is essentially the same type of 
assumption made in Love and Buccola's modeling of input demand equations in their 
primal system. 
The moment-based model is applied to field-level data on Indian rice production, 
and the first through third moments are found to be significant. Significant variability 
in risk attitudes among the population were found, ranging from risk neutral to very 
risk averse. 
Nelson and Preckel [42] seek to apply the moment-based concepts introduced by An­
tle, but improve efficiency of estimates by specifying a distribution function for output. 
They choose a conditional Beta distribution due to its ability to represent a skewed, 
bell-shaped density with a relatively small number of parameters. Application of the 
model is made to corn yield response to fertilizer inputs. 
Rather than model the moments of the distribution directly as functions of inputs 
(the approach taken by Antle), the Beta parameters a and (5 are assumed to be log-linear 
functions of the inputs, a(x) and (3{x). Specific functions of a and (3 define all of the 
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moments of the distribution. The first three moments of output are estimated using a 
maximum likelihood procedure. 
Farm-level corn yield and input data from the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
is used to estimate the distribution parameters, with nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium 
available as inputs. Soil variables were also available, and the data was separated into 
several subsets by region. The results from the estimation suggest that nitrogen and 
phosphorus tend to uniformly increase mean, variance and (postitive) skewness of yield 
in general, while the effect of potassium on the distribution is not consistent across 
regions. 
2.4 Physical Watershed Modeling 
The physical water quality model used here, SWAT, has been applied in several recent 
papers that seek to combine environmental and economic modeling techniques. A variety 
of approaches have been developed at several levels of detail. Some make use of SWAT to 
directly estimate or simulate water quality effects, while others use SWAT indirectly by 
calibrating other physical models to SWAT and observing environmental quality changes 
via the former. Economic modeling systems range from farm-level models to regional 
and national models. 
Whittaker, et al. [60] uses point observations from farm-level survey results to com­
pare two pollution abatement policies. The focus is on nitrogen inputs in the Columbia 
River Basin where safe nitrate limits are regularly exceeded. The two policies under 
consideration are an input tax on nitrogen and a so-called command and control policy 
that reduces nitrogen application by 25% at each point. 
The economic model used, data envelopment analysis, is a linear programming frame­
work that allows construction of a best management practice frontier over which a crite­
rion can be evaluated. Profit maximization was used as the objective, and the solution 
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for each point is obtained under the two competing policies. It is assumed that all 
nitrogen applied is in the form of anhydrous ammonia, applied only once before seeding. 
To work with the watershed scale requirements of SWAT, a means of distributing 
the farm-level point data across the watershed is needed. This is obtained through 
estimation of the assumed underlying surface of farm-level data and properties of the 
sample area. The authors make use of the averaged shifted histogram estimator for this. 
Each subbasin (8-digit Hydrologie Unit Code in this case) in the SWAT setup is assigned 
the mode of the estimated nitrogen application surface for that subbasin. 
The reduction policy of 25% is chosen as it apparently gives SWAT output results 
roughly equivalent to that of a 300% input tax. This tax level is the lowest that will 
induce reduced fertilizer application at every farm in the sample. Based on the results 
of the economic analysis comparing the two policy alternatives, the authors conclude 
that the tax is more efficient. However, depending on conditions, the policies could have 
comparable performance. 
On a smaller watershed scale but using operation-level data, Osei, it et al. [44] use a 
representative farm model interfaced with SWAT and another physical model to examine 
costs associated with changes in manure application in a watershed. The watershed is 
located in an area of Texas with a large concetration of dairy producers and the nutrient 
of interest is phosphorus. The aim of the analysis is to estimate the costs of a change in 
manure application practice; specifically, incorporating solid dairy manure rather than 
broadcasting it. 
The economic model is an optimization system designed for use in analyzing live­
stock and poultry operations. It is designed to capture farm-level economic impacts 
of changes in practices. The environmental model is the field-level Agricultural Policy 
Environmental Extender (APEX), a multi-field version of EPIC. APEX predicts edge-
of-field sediment and nutrient losses, which in turn are used to construct inputs for 
SWAT. 
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Three application scenarios are considered, one where manure is applied based on 
nitrogen needs of the crop, and two where application is made based on phosphorus 
needs of the crop. In the latter case the two rates vary depending on whether or not 
organic phosphorus is included in determining available phosphorus. For each scenario 
the environmental and economic results are tabulated under two separate assumptions. 
In one, manure is broadcast on the fields, and in the other it is incorporated or plowed 
into the soil. 
With incorporation, the reduction in phosphorus loss at the edge-of-field level ranges 
from around 20% to 40% relative to no incorporation depending on the application rate 
scenario. The economic impact of a change in practices to manure incorporation is found 
to be very small, in the range of 2% to 3% of net returns. 
Qiu and Prato [47] conduct an analysis of practice changes in a watershed on a scale 
similar to Osei, et al., but aggregate economic data at a larger scale. The goal is to 
model the impact of riparian buffers on in-stream concentration of atrazine jointly with 
the watershed-wide economic impact of changes in land allocation. 
SWAT does not allow for placement of buffer strips, so a simple downward scaling 
of output results is supposed to simulate the usage of buffer strips. The watershed is 
populated with 37 different "farming systems" differentiated by crop rotation, tillage 
method, fertilizer application level (discrete: low, medium, high), and pesticide applica­
tion level. There is also one unique system based on a grass with no chemical use that 
is a proxy for land in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The allocation of land 
to each of these systems within the watershed determines the outcomes in both SWAT 
and the economic model. 
The objective function for the economic model is total watershed net returns. A 
mathematical programming model is used and is based on the Cost and Return Estima­
tor (CARE) enterprise budget calculator. The goal is to select an allocation of land use 
resulting in efficient atrazine abatement at each subbasin outlet such that net returns 
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are maximized. Five levels of atrazine concentration are considered, and SWAT results 
yielding those levels are used as constraints. 
Baseline allocations are established with the "worst" management practices and no 
riparian buffers, and associated with a baseline level of net returns. The optimal alloca­
tions involve only 5 of the 37 systems, and are cataloged both with and without buffers. 
To obtain the "value" of the buffers at each abatement level, the net returns with and 
without buffers are compared. This yields a gross value of the buffers; subtracting the 
opportunity costs of the land used for buffers (put into CRP, for example) allows calcu­
lation of a net value. If the cost of maintaining the buffers is below the net value, they 
are a cost-effective means of achieving the given atrazine abatement level. 
Qiu and Prato [48] follow up on the above model by examining variations in riparian 
buffer characteristics across sub-basins. A linear regression model is estimated to assess 
the effect several buffer attributes have on its value as measured above. Using GIS data 
several characteristics are identified: stream length, channel slope, average land slope, 
percentage of cropped land and some soil attributes. Of the characteristics, only stream 
length and the percentage of cropped land had a positive effect on value. Others either 
had negative effects or were not significant. 
Moving to a much larger scale, Atwood, et al. [6] demonstrate techniques necessary to 
disaggregate a large sector model for interface with SWAT on a statewide or nationwide 
basis. The authors' interest is in environmental and economic policy assessment with 
the analysis centering on the introduction of a new crop variety and its effects. 
The economic model used is the Agricultural Sector Model (ASM), a mathematical 
programming framework that works at the state, regional, national and international 
levels. It determines a market equilibrium and the resulting effects on both resource use 
and prices. Effects of policy changes can be seen via a change in equilibrium. 
A key step in conducting the analysis is the bridging of data needed for economic and 
physical modeling. This data is collected over different spatial units and raises several 
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issues in how it can be aggregated or disaggregated. SWAT deals with data at the sub­
basin level, but ASM uses data based on much larger regions. The solution followed 
by these authors is to disaggregate ASM data to the county level based on information 
from the Census of Agriculture, National Resources Inventory and County Crops Data. 
Once the data is disaggregated to the county level, it is then aggregated to the subbasin 
level according to county surface contribution to each subbasin. 
The economic model is applied jointly with SWAT runs on a large portion of Texas. 
The scenario examined is one in which a new crop variety is introduced. SWAT results 
indicate both improvements and worsening of water quality indicators depending on 
subbasin location. Economic effects include benefits for consumers, losses for producers 
(particularly those outside Texas) but a net gain at both U.S. and world levels. 
Atwood, et al. [7] again apply ASM and SWAT jointly in pursuit of a more specific 
water quality policy scenario. They seek to quantify the costs of reducing nitrogen use 
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Excess nitrogen from the corn belt is cited as a 
major contributor to the hypoxia problem in the Mississippi outlet. 
Using the EPIC model, the analysis calculates a specific reduction in corn yield asso­
ciated with nitrogen application reductions. Simulating decreases in nitrogen application 
provides input for both SWAT and ASM and can be compared to a baseline in which 
there is no nitrogen reduction. Two levels of "nitrogen stress" are examined, 5% and 
10%. The 10% N-stress level resulted in an approximate 5% reduction in nitrogen loads 
at the Mississippi River outlet according to SWAT simulations. 
The net economic effect of the two policies provides an interesting insight into the 
interaction of yields, nutrients and profitability. Due to the commodity price effect, the 
10% N-stress level policy had a smaller loss in net profits than the 5% N-stress level, 
-$16.4 million versus -$7.4 million. 
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3. FIRM LEVEL ECONOMIC MODEL 
In this chapter the derivation of the economic model used to simulate and evaluate 
policy options is presented. The specification is explored and estimation results ap­
pear in Chapter 4. The first step in developing a modeling system to study alternative 
policies regarding nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer use is to estimate a firm level pro­
duction model that captures the key tradeoffs between nitrogen application, phosphorus 
application, and profitability. 
3.1 Introduction 
There are several requirements for a model that will allow proper interfacing with 
the SWAT physical water quality model. The primary need is that the model provide 
estimates of nutrient application rates that can change according to the abatement 
policies chosen. In addition, a means of comparing the policies in terms of the economic 
effects on producers is useful. An ability to measure the distribution of returns in the 
watershed to nutrient application under the policies will accomplish this, as the change 
in returns associated with each policy relative to the status quo can serve this purpose. A 
field-level model is sufficient as long as aggregations to the watershed level are possible. 
The unit of analysis is a single firm or farm which maximizes expected returns from 
nutrient application through its choice of inputs, given location-specific environmental 
characteristics, input prices and the output price. Farmers are assumed to be risk-neutral 
. The inputs focused on in this study are two commercial fertilizers components which 
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are heavily applied on corn crops: nitrogen and phosphorus. The following sections 
cover the modeling approach in detail. 
3.2 The Farmer's Problem 
The general econometric model used here is based on the heteroskedastic model first 
proposed by Just and Pope [35]. The farmer is assumed to maximize returns to fertilizer 
application, given some site-specific characteristics which include a general soil measure 
and relavent prices. The general form of the farmer's problem is 
maxE[7r(z, z)\ 
with x denoting inputs and z site characteristics. 
A graphical representation of the relation between yield mean and variance appears 
in Figure 3.1. Lower fertilizer applications result in lower yields, but with less variability 
in those yields and the associated returns, representing heteroskedasticity in inputs. This 
is due to the existence of a base yield for most land; that is, at low levels of fertilizer 
input, yields tend to show little difference across farms. In these cases, fertilizer levels are 
the limiting factor for yield rather than site-specific characteristics. Conversely, higher 
levels of fertilizer application lead to higher yields on average, but numerous vagaries in 
weather, soil, land/crop management and other factors result in a wider spread of yield 
outcomes. Put another way, crops are receiving nutrients at or above their biological 
needs, and are limited by variables other than nutrient availability. Farmers applying 
higher levels of fertilizer are choosing input levels that will result in yields that are higher 
on average, but which are less likely to be in a given range of the mean yield for those 
fertilizer application levels. 
The yield relation employs a Cobb-Douglas production function for both the mean 
and variance component. This choice of production technology requires the estimation 
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Yield 
Fertilizer Application 
Figure 3.1 Relationship between yield mean and variability 
of a relatively small number of parameters, an important consideration when limited 
instrumental variables are available. With the two inputs being considered here, the 
production technology is 
y = Ax^ x?? + Bx^ x'ge (3.1) 
where y is corn output measured in bushels per acre, xi is pounds per acre of nitrogen 
applied, x2 is pounds per acre of phosphorus applied, A,B, ait bi (i — 1,2) are para­
meters to be estimated, and e is a disturbance term distributed N(0,1). This imposes 
constant returns to acreage, which seems reasonable if it is assumed that farmers have 
already incurred most of their large capital costs (e.g., machinery) in choosing to be in 
production. With this construction and specific placement of the disturbance term, the 
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inputs influence both the mean and variance of yield response. Specifically, the yield 
mean depends on the first term, 
E[?/] = + 
= 
and the variance depends on the second, 
Var (y) = V^Ax^x 2^) + VailBx^x^s) 
= g^z^Var(E) = 
With these specifics, the farmer's problem can be expressed as 
max (E[(p{Ax\1x<2 + Bx^xfye) — nxi - r2x2)]) , or 
max (pAx^x22 - rxxi — r2x2), (3.2) 
where and r2 represent input prices, and p represents the output price. 
3.3 Solution to the Farmer's Problem 
The first-order conditions for interior solutions to (3.2) are 
Apaiz"1-1^ 2 —r\ = 0  
Apa2Xi1X22~1 — r2 — 0 
which simply state that the farmer chooses X\ and z2 such that value marginal product 
of each input is equated to the price of the input. These yield the relations 
r2ai Xi = x2 
n a2 
na2 x2 = Xi 
r2ai 
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which together lead to input demand expressions 
%i(ri,r2,p) 
pAai 
a1+a2 —1 
3=2(n,r2,p) 
r2 f fiai \ -ClA ai+°2-1 
To jointly estimate these relations, it is assumed that there are some random errors 
associated with nutrient levels. These could take the form of measurement error in 
the data or several other factors outside of prices that might influence the application 
decisions. 
One factor that influces the application decisions is soil quality. Incorporated into 
the constant "A" term is a site-specific measure of soil quality. This exogenous variables 
can be introduced into the equations corresponding to the first-order conditions through 
the formulation of the farmer's problem rather than simply assuming that they enter in 
some unknown fashion. In estimation of the model presented here this term is 
where CSR is the soil Corn Suitability Rating associated with the farm location.1 In 
the following discussion this decomposition is supressed for notational convenience. The 
estimable version of the first-order conditions is then 
with correlated error terms vi,v2 ~ N(0, Ev). Note that it should also be assumed that 
these are likewise correlated with e, the disturbance term from the production relation. 
To proceed with estimation of the parameters, it will be helpful to reformulate the 
production relation in order to remove the heteroscedasticity that is built into the pro­
1This variable is further discussed in Section 4.1. 
A — olq + Oi\{CSR), 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
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duction relation via the variance-influencing term Bx^x^e. Subtracting the mean-
influencing term Ax^x^2 from the right hand side of (3.1) and dividing through by 
x^x22 results in 
^ (3-5) 
Xi x2 
Relations (3.4), (3.4), and (3.5) cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least 
squares due to the cross-equation parameter restrictions and the correlation between 
the error components of each equation. Estimation using three-stage least squares will 
avoid these problems and is used here. Given a matrix of joint errors E for the sys­
tem defined by (3.4)—(3.5), the element E3i3 is B2, the variance of the error term in 
equation (3.5) and other diagonal elements are similarly the variance of vi and u2, with 
nonzero covariance allowed for the off-diagonal elements. Estimation proceeds with the 
system of equations as described in Chapter 4.3. 
After obtaining parameter estimates for the system described above, it is necessary 
to obtain fitted values of the inputs to proceed with simulations of policy scenarios. 
For a given set of input and output prices, solutions for a range of CSR values can be 
obtained and the results used to perform the simulations needed for the physical water 
quality model. To accomplish this, the parameter estimates obtained from fitting (3.4)-
(3.5) are used in conjunction with each observation's input/output prices and CSR to 
determine the X\ and x2 that result for the estimated input demand equations. 
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4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sources and construction of data used 
in the economic model presented in Chapter 3 and to present results of the estimation 
of that model. The data used for estimation and analysis can be placed into two general 
categories. One is the set of data and variables needed to estimate the econometric 
model outlined in Section 4.3. The second category is the data needed to calibrate and 
run the physical simulation model (SWAT) for the Raccoon river watershed. The data 
used in the SWAT model is described in Chapter 5. 
4.1 Data 
There are three types of data used for estimation of the economic model: corn 
production input and output data, site-specific soil data and other exogenous variables 
to be used as instruments, and input and output prices. This section will provide an 
overview of all data sources and describe the means by which they are linked to create 
a unified data set. 
4.1.1 The Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
The USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) is a detailed source 
of information on farms' resource use, financial condition, and production practices. 
Overseen by the USDA's Economic Research Service and National Agricultural Statistics 
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Service (NASS), its beginnings go back to 1975, though its form and scope changed 
somewhat in 1996 when it took its current name. It combines data that previously was 
collected under separate surveys known as the Cropping Practices Survey and the Farm 
Costs and Returns Survey. 
The ARMS data consists of surveys of farm households on cropping practices, chem­
ical application, and operational costs, and is intended for use in policy analysis. In 
2001, survey coverage of corn and soybeans moved from annual collection to three-year 
rotating coverage, reducing its usefulness. The corn data available for this study runs 
from 1996-2001. 
The ARMS data involves surveying on three levels, referred to by NASS as "phases." 
Surveying runs from June of the survey year through the following April. The initial 
step, Phase I, is a screening phase. Conducted during the summer, it collects information 
on the crops in production, livestock inventory, and sales values at sites selected for the 
survey. 
Phase II, referred to as the "Production Practices Report," takes place in the fall and 
winter; information on field-level cultivation practices as well as chemical and resource 
use is collected from operators selected in Phase I. This is very similar to what had been 
collected in the Cropping Practices Survey prior to the inception of ARMS in 1996. 
In the spring, a subsample of all farmers is surveyed for Phase III, a whole-farm cost 
of production survey called the "Costs and Returns Report." In addition to this global 
subsample, farmers growing a specific crop may also be sampled depending on the year. 
This phase contains more breadth of information than Phase II. For example, while 
Phase II concentrates only on the details of one particular crop, Phase III will contain a 
list of all crops grown on the farm and specific acreage allocated to them. While Phase 
II information is collected every year1 for the major crops of interest in Iowa (corn and 
soybeans), Phase III information is collected only intermittently. 
1Up to 2001. 
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Surveys collect information from personal interviews with farmers. Surveyor training 
is provided via state statisticians who also perform quality control checks on the collected 
data. In addition to training, surveyors receive extensive documentation in the form of 
manuals which detail specific procedures, interpretation of responses, and numerous 
examples of typical responses. The final data set is not a true time series because it 
does not track the same farms year by year but is rather an annual sampling of all farms 
available to the surveyors. 
Phase II survey results will provide nearly all of the variables necessary to fit the 
economic model: per-acre yield of corn for grain, application of total nitrogen, appli­
cation of total phosphorus, crop residue on the field, and previous crop.2 A short data 
description follows: 
Yield Output of corn measured in bushels per acre. 
Total Nitrogen Application of nitrogen to corn crop measured in pounds per acre. 
This is total pounds of nitrogen in the fertilizer, calculated from a commercial 
product description provided by the farmer. 
Total Phosphorus Application of phosphorus to corn crop measured in pounds per 
acre. This is total pounds of phosphorus in the fertilizer, calculated from a com­
mercial product description provided by the farmer. 
Residue The percentage of residue left on the field following tillage operations. This is 
calculated from information the farmer provides on tillage passes and equipment. 
Previous Crop The crop planted on the field the previous season. This is used to 
construct dummy variables for some of the most common rotations. The most 
common is the corn-soybean rotation. 
2The latter two variables are not used directly in the model but as instruments in the estimation 
procedure. 
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The missing pieces are soil information that will provide a measure of productivity 
potential, input and output prices for corn production, and soybean prices to be used 
as an instrument. Using a soil map and location information from the ARMS surveys it 
is possible to assign a CSR to each ARMS point. Soil data and the means by which it 
is merged with the ARMS points are described in section 4.1.2 below. Details regarding 
input and output price data appear in section 4.1.3. A complete copy of a Phase II 
questionnaire is included in Appendix C. 
In a number of cases, there are missing values in the ARMS dataset. The missing 
values can be divided into two categories: missing location information (prevalent in 
1996 data almost exclusively) and missing input/output data. Location information 
is required in order to assign soil property information with each observation, so data 
points without this information is not of use in model estimation. Table 4.1 lists the 
sample size for each year of ARMS Phase II for corn and the number of observations 
with missing location information. 
Table 4.1 Missing location information by year 
Number of Number that are 
Year observations missing location 
1996 1009 760 
1997 205 0 
1998 213 0 
1999 201 1 
2000 190 2 
2001 179 0 
Total 1997 763 
As can be seen in the table, nearly all of the missing values occur in the 1996 set. 
Interestingly, 1996 is also the year with the largest number of observations; removing 
those which are missing location information leaves 249 usable observations, very similar 
in size to the other five years of the sample. Before discarding these observations, it is 
important to examine what effect their removal has on the sample. Table 4.2 reports 
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basic sample statistics for variables used in the estimation, grouped by availability of 
location data in 1996. As can be seen in the table, there is little difference between 
the two sub-samples and thus little of concern in excluding those observations lacking 
location information. This leaves 1,234 observations with valid location data. 
Table 4.2 Sample comparison, 1996 observations with and without location 
With location Without location 
Standard Standard 
Variable Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Yield 137.9208 30.93 136.15 32.76 
Total Nitrogen 120.96 47.14 122.52 51.98 
Total Phosphorus 44.05 35.64 43.28 33.31 
Residue 28.40 17.02 29.33 17.77 
Corn-soybean rotation dummy 0.66 0.48 0.70 0.46 
Missing input and output data will also require the discarding of several observa­
tions. There are five observations missing residue values, and omitting yield values that 
are either missing or zero excludes 152 observations, leaving 1,077. There are four ob­
servations which have unusually large values for nitrogen application (greater than 300 
pounds per acre); these are omitted as being inconceivably large. In fact, when examin­
ing the data at the survey level—the main ARMS data file is constructed from several 
subsections, one of which contains detailed fertilizer entries for each observation—these 
observations have information that conflicts with what is presented in the main data 
file. This leaves 1,073 observations. Nitrogen application levels of zero are also omitted 
for two reasons: (1) it is unlikely that any corn grower is not applying at least some 
nitrogen and (2) the model requires strictly positive values of the inputs. A Stone-Geary 
type production function (where x\ is replaced by Xi — xbase in (3.1), with Xbase some 
base level of nitrogen existing in the soil) was attempted but due to the relatively small 
number of zero-input observations had very poor fit. This excludes an additional 74 
observations, leaving 999 observations. A similar exclusion of phosphorus applications 
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that are missing or zero excludes another 178 observations. This is necessary for the 
model to run (a Stone-Geary version of production for phosphorus was also attempted 
without success, again likely due to a small number of zero observations) but is not ideal, 
as there is not as strong a rationale for excluding farmers who may apply no phosphorus. 
The final sample size for use in estimation is then 821 observations, and discussion of 
the "ARMS sample" from this point onward refers to this modified data set. 
Table 4.3 contains sample statistics for this data set. Although the input and output 
variables have quite large ranges, the low and high end contain relatively few observations 
and the bulk of the distributions of those variables seem to be in a reasonable range. For 
example, while there are nitrogen applications that range from only 8 pounds per acre to 
a very large 300 pounds per acre, the interquartile range is from 110 to 153 pounds per 
acre. The distributions of phosphorus application and yield show similarly reasonable 
numbers. 
Table 4.3 Statistics for the ARMS sample, n = 821 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 1st Qrt Median 3rd Qrt 
Yield 144.51 26.95 2.5 224 130 150 162 
Nitrogen 128.57 42.14 8 300 110 133 153 
Phosphorus 58.40 30.93 2.76 300 40 52 70 
Residue 27.19 16.47 0 81 15 26 33 
Corn-soy 0.78 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 
Figure 4.1 shows a comparison between ARMS geographical coverage and the average 
total corn acreage in Iowa from 1996 to 2001. For reasons of confidentiality, ARMS data 
cannot be disclosed in aggregate if three or fewer observations are used to calculate 
the aggregate measure. Because there are a few counties with relatively low intensity 
of agricultural production and thus fewer than three observations, these counties must 
be merged with some other spatial unit to allow their inclusion in a summary. Rather 
than do this, the choice was made to base this comparison on Crop Reporting Districts, 
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Harvest 15.1% Harvest 14.3% Harvest 12.0% 
ARMS 15.6% ARMS 12.8% ARMS 16.2% 
Harvest 14.7% Harvest 14.7% 
Harvest 10.7% 
ARMS 12.4% ARMS 16.3% 
ARMS 9.0% 
Harvest 8.0% Harvest 3.7% Harvest 6.8% 
ARMS 6.5% ARMS 3.7% ARMS 7.6% 
Figure 4.1 Comparison of ARMS sample point distribution and NASS total 
corn harvest acreage distribution, 1996-2001 
which are collections of counties often used as a geographic unit in agricultural statistics; 
Iowa has nine Crop Reporting Disctricts. This makes the comparison easier to represent 
graphically without losing much information. The goal is to examine how closely the 
ARMS sample used here matches the true distribution of acreage in the state of Iowa. 
The percentage of total observations in each Crop Reporting Disctrict found in the 
ARMS sample appears as the bottom number in Figure 4.1 while the same percentage 
according NASS harvest acreage (USDA-NASS) [54] is the top number. As seen in 
the figure, there is a nearly 1:1 ratio of ARMS representation to measured acreage, 
with the largest discrepancy occurring in northeastern Iowa, an area with relatively 
little agriculture in the north but greater concentration in the south. Examination of 
individual county distribution supports this observation and explains the divergence in 
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the two numbers for this district. 
4.1.2 Soil data 
One important piece of information that is lacking in the ARMS data is site-specific 
soil properties. Although location information (latitude and longitude) is provided in 
the surveys, due to confidentiality restrictions it is not possible to directly match the 
survey locations with a soil map. This section discusses the soil data, variable chosen, 
and the method by which soil data is assigned to ARMS data points. 
Soil data is taken from the Iowa Soil Properties and Interpretation Database (IS-
PAID) [26]. This database is a compilation of soil survey data that has been assembled 
by the Iowa Cooperative Soil Survey, a group of government and extension agencies. It 
provides the most detailed spatial information available on Iowa soils. Due to confiden­
tiality issues, it is not possible to interface the ISPAID data directly to the ARMS data.3 
To overcome this limitation, a statewide geographical grid is constructed and interfaced 
with the ISPAID in GIS form. Each point on the grid is then assigned soil properties 
based on its location relative to the ISPAID data. A program written in GAUSS, which 
is available at the NASS data access site, then matches ARMS data point locations to 
the closest corresponding point on the soil grid. The soil grid is approximately 300 by 
650 points, with each point separated by 0.01 degrees. At Iowa's longitude and latitude, 
this corresponds to roughly half a mile east to west and two thirds of a mile north to 
south, so four grid points define an area of approximately one-third of a square mile. 
Although there are dozens of variables available in the ISPAID dataset, it is necessary 
to choose from those that are also available in the National Resources (NRI) dataset 
for interfacing with SWAT in the Raccoon watershed. This is necessary because the 
NRI point is the basis on which the data will be matched for use in the water quality 
simulation model. A description of the NRI dataset can be found in Chapter 5 and a 
3The ARMS data can only be accessed at a NASS site, where GIS software is unavailable. 
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description of the matching procedure appears on page 60 of the current chapter. 
The most useful and parsimonious of the soil variables available is the Corn Suitability 
Rating (CSR). The CSR reported in ISPAID is a relative ranking of all soils mapped in 
the state of Iowa based on their potential to be utilized for intensive corn production. It 
can be used as an index to compare one soil's potential yield against another. Ratings 
range from 100 for soils with no physical limitations, on minimal slopes, and will support 
continuous row crop production to a rating of 5 for soils that are not appropriate for 
row crops. The CSR values provided in the ISPAID set have associated with them a 
set of assumptions which include adequate managment, no irrigation, and tile drainage 
where necessary for production. A particularly attractive characteristic of the CSR as a 
measure of potential productivity is the fact that, even though average yields may rise 
or fall due to changes in management, technology, weather patterns, etc., the relative 
rankings of the soils will be unaffected. 
4.1.3 Prices 
The final piece needed for model estimation is input and output prices. There are 
several issues that must be confronted in constructing both sets of prices, and auxiliary 
data is needed to generate the input prices needed for the model. Information on data 
sources and procedures will be provided in this section. 
Input prices 
Base fertilizer prices were obtained from an annual USDA-NASS agricultural price 
compilation (USDA-NASS). Reported prices are for specific fertilizer blends—for ex­
ample, 18-46-0 (Diammonium Phosphate or DAP) is 18% nitrogen, 46% phosphorus, 
and 0% potassium. Spatially, prices vary only by region, with Iowa being in the North 
Central region. Since different blends are more prevalent in some areas, prices for every 
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blend are not available for each region. The full set of prices is included in Appendix A 
or for download from a NASS source [53]. 
The inputs used in estimation are measured in pounds of application, so it is necessary 
to devise a means of converting the prices associated with each blend to a price per pound 
of the nutrient itself. It would be possible to simply average the price per actual pound of 
nutrient content, but a more appropriate approach would be to use the fertilizer blends 
most commonly purchased in the state to construct a weighted average. 
The Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS) maintains fer­
tilizer sales data that tracks statewide use by blend [23]. Only two years of data are 
available, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, but there are minimal differences between the dis­
tribution of blend popularity. The bulk of this distribution can be seen in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5. 
Table 4.4 Distribution of fertilizer sales by blend, most popular straight 
materials 
Percentage of total Percentage of total 
Blend (N-P-K) 2002-2003 2003-2004 
0-0-61 25.11% 26.71% 
82-0-0 18.29% 18.03% 
32-0-0 13.14% 15.96% 
18-46-0 13.25% 12.98% 
28-0-0 12.84% 10.43% 
46-0-0 7.62% 6.75% 
11-52-0 6.74% 6.40% 
Source: http://www.agriculture.state.ia.us/fertilizertonreport.htm 
Intersecting the set of blends from IDALS with those blends listed by USDA-NASS 
reveals that there are some fertilizer products that appear in one but not the other. 
This makes the task of devising a weighting scheme slightly more complicated. One of 
the straight materials and most of the blends are unavailable in the USDA-NASS prices. 
The missing straight material is 0-0-61, but since potash is not one of the nutrients in 
the model this is of no consequence. Only one of the blends listed in Table 4.5 is listed 
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Table 4.5 Distribution of fertilizer sales by blend, most popular blends 
Percentage of total Percentage of total 
Blend (N-P-K) 2002-2003 2003-2004 
2-6-35 27.08% 29.79% 
3-10-30 28.78% 29.04% 
4-10-10 6.50% 8.06% 
9-18-9 5.45% 7.56% 
7-21-7 6.99% 6.38% 
Source: http://www.agriculture.state.ia.us/fertilizertonreport.htm 
in the USDA-NASS price data. However, blends make up a much smaller portion of 
fertilizer sales than do the straight materials (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A) 
and thus their exclusion will have little effect on the process of determining prices. 
This leaves an abbreviated set of six blends and straight materials from which input 
prices can be constructed. Four of these blends provide nitrogen (82-0-0, 32-0-0, 28-0-0, 
46-0-0) and two provide primarily phosphorus (18-46-0, 11-52-0).4 The latter two will 
be used to weight phosphorus prices and the former set used to weight nitrogen prices. 
The percentage representation in the sales data is re-weighted based on these two sets, 
using the average of the 2002-3 and 2003-4 sales data. The resulting weights appear in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Weighting scheme for nutrient price calculations 
Blend (N-P-K) N Weight P Weight 
Ni 82-0-0 0.352384595 
#2 32-0-0 0.282388283 
Pi 18-46-0 
n3 28-0-0 0.225761436 
N4 46-0-0 0.139465687 
P2 11-52-0 
0.666160412 
0.333839588 
Before these weights can be used, it is necessary to construct a per-pound nutrient 
price for each product. Let the per-ton price of each blend be represented by RJk where j 
4 Alt hough 18-46-0 and 11-52-0 contain nitrogen, they are considered straight materials by IDALS. 
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is the blend as indicated in Table 4.6 and k is the nutrient to which the weight belongs. 
For example, the price of 18-46-0 would be r}p. Also let 9{ be the fraction of the nutrient 
k in blend j and let Wj be the weight associated with blend j (the "weight" columns in 
Table 4.6). Using the full USDA-NASS prices, the price of a pound of nutrient in blend 
j is 
^ =  k-
Once all of the rj,s have been calculated, the final calculated price of nutrient k can be 
expressed as 
rk = j2wjri-
3 
Once these annual prices are calculated, they are deflated to 1996 prices using the 
Consumer Price Index. At that point they are ready for use in model estimation. 
Output prices 
Output prices were obtained from the Iowa NASS office via a website database that 
has since been taken offline; currently, only statewide prices are available. However, the 
original prices are reprinted in Appendix A. The corn prices used for estimation vary 
by both year and county, the latter reflecting small spatial variations in prices received 
by farmers. Soybean prices, used as an instrument in estimation, were available from 
the same dataset and are also reported in Appendix A. 
Summary 
Table 4.7 contains summary statistics for the complete data set used in estimation. 
A total of 821 observations are available for use. The distribution of corn yield appears 
reasonable, with the interquartile range between 130 and 162. There are a few very large 
and very small values but a relatively compact distribution. The same is true of most 
of the input variables, although phosphorus values may be slightly higher than would 
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be expected due to the removal of the zero-value observations. The rotation dummy 
indicates that approximately 80% of the farmers in the sample are following a corn-
soybean rotation. Basic statistics are also provided for prices, with raw data available 
in Appendix A. Note that the ARMS sample is drawn from a different set of farms each 
year, and is therefore not a true time-series data set. 
Table 4.7 Summary of data to be used in model estimation, n — 821 
Standard First Third 
Variable Symbol Mean deviation Minimum Quartile Median Quartile Maximum 
Yield y 144.51 26.95 2.5 130 150 162 224 
Nitrogen input Xl 128.57 42.14 8 110 133 153 300 
Phosphorus input %2 58.40 30.93 2.76 40 52 70 300 
Residue 27.19 16.46 0 15 26 33 81 
Corn-bean dummy 0.78 0.41 0 1 1 1 1 
Corn suitability rating cs# 66.92 21.04 5 58 72 81 100 
Nitrogen price n 0.2177 0.0411 0.1672 0.1712 0.2400 0.2576 0.2754 
Phosphorus price r2 0.2708 0.0295 0.2297 0.2326 0.2691 0.2830 0.3136 
Corn price P 1.98 0.42 1.46 1.65 1.75 2.39 2.81 
Soybean price 5.28 1.36 3.85 4.08 4.60 6.18 7.36 
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4.2 Joining ARMS and NRI Data 
Because of SWAT's input needs (details follow in Chapter 5) and restrictions on the 
use of the ARMS data, it is necessary to devise a means of transferring the results of the 
estimated model to a form that can work with SWAT. The NRI provides the watershed-
scale data needed to run SWAT and is easily applied to agricultural watersheds [28]. The 
common variable used to link the datasets is the soil suitability for corn production. 
The NRI contains information on soil type, which includes a measure of corn yield 
potential. While it employs a different metric than the CSR described in Section 4.1.2, 
it is a comparable suitability measure. The particular variable is described as the "Non-
irrigated Crop Yield (NIRRYLD)" and is defined as the per-acre expected yield in an 
average year under a high level of management [55]. 
Because the two measures, CSR and NIRRYLD, are on different scales (an index 
from 5 to 100 vs. an expected yield) some means of transferring between measures is 
needed. Several distribution-based methods were evaluated: matching by decile, match­
ing by quartile, matching by halves, and a simple scaling of the entire range of NIRRYLD 
values. Using the sum of squared percentage deviations from the ARMS-based CSR dis­
tribution as a criterion, the simple scaling method most closely matched the NIRRYLD 
distribution to the ARMS-based CSR distribution. Details appear in Table 4.8. The 
simple scaling method maps the lowest and highest NIRRYLD values (50 and 170 bushels 
per acre) to the extremes of CSR value (5 and 100) and uniformly scales values that lie 
within the entire interval. A distribution comparison of the original ARMS-based CSR 
and simply scaled NRI CSR can be found in Figure 4.2. 
The only point-specific variation in the ARMS-based model is by CSR. Once the 
model is estimated, parameters can be applied to NRI points and simulations can take 
place just as they would with the ARMS points. The results of these simulations are 
used to generate input for SWAT and are the physical translation/expression of the 
economic model. 
Table 4.8 Percent deviation of NRI CSR distributions from ARMS-based 
CSR 
Bin value Deciles Quartiles Halves Simple Scale 
5 -2.25 -2.25 -2.25 -2.25 
10 -0.02 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 
15 0.94 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 
20 1.24 1.10 1.10 0.81 
25 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 -1.31 
30 1.17 -0.94 -0.94 -0.63 
35 0.75 0.37 0.41 0.50 
40 -0.24 1.27 1.23 0.48 
45 3.97 0.89 0.89 0.71 
50 -3.73 2.31 2.49 2.49 
55 -1.63 -0.86 -1.04 -1.15 
60 -1.95 1.48 1.48 -2.00 
65 5.47 1.45 3.04 -0.52 
70 -2.44 -2.44 -4.02 -2.08 
75 5.98 -3.62 -4.65 -0.14 
80 -9.66 6.82 0.96 -0.43 
85 5.76 -1.13 4.95 2.06 
90 -3.17 -3.32 -4.06 -0.38 
95 -2.18 -2.03 -1.31 1.09 
100 2.99 2.99 3.83 3.83 
Sum of Squared 
Differences 268.46 112.57 126.00 45.99 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of CSR from ARMS soil matchup compared to con­
verted CSR in the NRI data 
63 
4.3 Model Estimation and Results 
This section applies the model developed in Chapter 3 to the data described in 
Section 4.1 above. The econometric means of estimation is described, and the results of 
the estimation process are presented. Section 4.3.1 will cover the estimation procedure 
in detail, with results appearing in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Estimation Procedure 
The model to* be estimated is that described by equations (3.4), (3.4), and (3.5). It 
is helpful to restate the the system of equations to be estimated: 
where Ai = a0 + a.\(CSRi) and i>i, i>2, Be are jointly distributed with a mean vector of 
zero and error matrix E. Input and output prices are subscripted i as they vary across 
observation, as does CSR. This system is estimated using a nonlinear three-stage least 
squares procedure in the Time Series Processor5 (TSP) estimation package, the 3SLS 
function. In short, three-stage least squares is a combination of a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression and two-stage least squares. Instrumental variables estimates are obtained 
taking into account the covariance between equation errors (i.e., the off-diagonal elements 
of £). The method used by TSP is that of Jorgenson and Laffont [33] in that the 
instrumental variables are applied to all equations. 
The instruments used in estimation are the price of soybeans, residue left on the 
field (a measure of the tillage method used by the farmer), and a dummy variable 
5Although its original purpose was to estimate time-series models, TSP has long been used with 
cross-sectional and panel data. 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Hi ~ AjxW x%\ (4.3) 
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indicating whether the farmer is following a corn-soybean or a continuous-corn crop 
rotation. Although it could be argued that the choice of crop rotation and tillage are 
endogenous, the assumption made here is that rotation and tillage choice are long run 
decisions and are thus exogenous in a given year. The instruments are assumed to be 
correlated with profitability of corn production and/or fertilizer input usage, but not 
related to individual farmers' errors. 
4.3.2 Estimation Results 
Parameter estimates and standard errors from three stage least squares estimation 
of the system appear in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Parameter estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
ota 26.11 12.0398 2.17 .030 
OL1 0.75 0.1825 4.11 < .001 
«1 0.09 0.0013 69.72 < .001 
a2 0.05 0.0010 51.10 < .001 
bi 0.38 0.1696 2.24 .025 
b2 0.28 0.2386 1.18 .237 
The signs of the estimated parameters are as expected: positive and indicative of 
decreasing returns for scale in production inputs, positive effect of CSR on yield and 
input choice, and increasing variability of yields with higher input levels. However, the 
heteroskedasticity effect for phosphorus is not statistically significant. This suggests that 
only nitrogen has a heteroskedastic effect on yield. The value of the residual variance, 
while not technically an estimate, can serve as a proxy for the value of B, the premul-
tiplied term in yield variance. That residual variance, call it Be, is approximately 4.52 
which suggests a value for B of 2.13. 
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5. WATER QUALITY MODEL AND THE STUDY AREA 
This chapter describes the model used to evaluate water quality changes associated 
with the policy scenarios under study. General background information on the study 
area—the Raccoon River Watershed in central Iowa—is described and is followed by 
an explanation of the model's mechanics and an enumeration of its inputs and outputs 
as they relate to the application discussed in this paper. The chapter also describes 
the procedures for generating baseline economic and physical representations of the 
watershed. 
5.1 The Raccoon Watershed 
The Racoon River Watershed is comprised of approximately 9400 square kilometers 
(about 3600 square miles) of prime agricultural land. This is slightly more than 6% of 
Iowa's total surface area. Location and land use information can be seen in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2. The Raccoon River is the main stream for the watershed and, along with its 
tributaries, drains at least part of seventeen Iowa counties (Figure 5.1). Most of the 
watershed is contained within the Des Moines Lobe geological formation (Figure 5.2). 
Soils in this area are extremely fertile. 
Approximately 75% of the watershed's surface area is used for production of corn and 
soybeans [32]. Nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer are applied at relatively high levels 
on the corn crop and constitute the primary nonpoint nutrient pollutant source in the 
watershed. 
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Figure 5.1 Raccoon watershed and contiguous Iowa counties 
Nitrate levels have been a concern in the watershed for quite some time, because 
nitrate is a regulated drinking water contaminant. The Des Moines Water Works supplies 
about 17% of Iowa's population with drinking water and draws heavily from the Raccoon 
and an infiltration gallery associated with the river. 
There are two general water quality issues important to those affected by nutrient 
levels in the Raccoon watershed. One is the nitrate levels at the Des Moines Water 
Works (DMWW). The DMWW provides drinking water for the Des Moines metro area, 
containing a population of nearly one-half million. It draws water from three sources: the 
Raccoon River, the Des Moines River, and an infiltration gallery. In 1990 the DMWW 
invested in a nitrate-removal system in response to nitrate levels that exceeded drinking 
water standards. The DMWW activates this nitrate removal facility during periods of 
possible nitrate level increases. The costs of permanently removing nitrate from the 
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Figure 5.2 Iowa geological formations and the Raccoon River Watershed 
water are much larger than the cost of disposal, so the removed nitrate is reintroduced 
to the river downstream from the DMWW. From there it continues on to the Mississippi 
river and eventually to the Gulf of Mexico. The facility cost $3.7 million to construct in 
1990 and runs on average 45 days per year, at an average daily treatment volume of 10 
million gallons of water for drinking. Daily cost at this volume is in the area of $3,000 
for operating costs alone. 
The impact of water quality degradation on the recreational activities in the wa­
tershed area is another important consideration. Phosphorus is the limiting factor in 
the excess growth of algae which is visually unappealing, results in offensive odors, cre­
ates hypoxic or anoxic conditions leading to fish kills, and can contribute to dangerous 
levels of toxic cyanobacteria (similar to a freshwater "red tide"). Given these effects, 
phosphorus levels are a strong indicator of local freshwater quality. The Raccoon water­
shed contains nine lakes that offer significant recreational opportunities but which vary 
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widely in water quality. For this reason, the impact of agricultural phosphorus use is an 
important factor in the quality of recreational opportunities available in the watershed. 
5.2 Background on the Soil and Water Assessment Tool 
The Soil and Water Assessment Tool, or SWAT, is designed to simulate the effects of 
watershed management on water quality and water flow. It is primarily used for model­
ing non-point source contributions to nutrient and sediment loads within a watershed. 
Thus it is ideally suited for modeling the water quality effects of changes in agricultural 
nutrient application. It is an evolutionary step in the development of an earlier model, 
the Simulator for Water Resources in Rural Basins (SWRRB). The latter incorporated 
components of other pre-existing models designed to estimate crop growth, surface and 
ground water hydrology, nutrient and chemical transport, runoff or sediment transport, 
among others. 
The main drawbacks to the SWRRB model were limitations on spatial applicability: 
it was limited in the number of sub-watersheds (or subbasins) allowed, and simply routed 
output from each subbasin directly to the main watershed outlet. For larger watersheds, 
the former restiction is problematic; the latter restriction was a consequence of the first, 
and produced less realistic simulations the larger the watershed. SWAT was developed 
as a way of integrating multiple SWRRB runs into one modeling system by routing 
from subbasin to subbasin, allowing the modeling of much larger and more complex 
watersheds. 
5.3 Model Setup 
The watershed under study is divided into many smaller parts, referred to as subwa-
tersheds or subbasins. This is useful because different regions of the watershed often have 
unique combinations of many factors (e.g., land use, soil type) and must be considered 
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Figure 5.3 Raccoon watershed subbasins and stream routing 
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separately while remaining related spatially. Each subbasin has four general categories 
of characteristics: 
1. Weather and climate 
2. Ponds, reservoirs, or other bodies of water within the watershed 
3. Groundwater and main channel routing 
4. Land cover, soil, and land management. 
Changes in one of the components of the last item on the above list, land management, 
will drive the differences in scenario results. Figure 5.3 shows the subbasins and stream 
routing as defined by SWAT for runs on the Raccoon river watershed. Although SWAT 
automatically delineates subbasins1, it is possible to force this delineation process to cre­
ate subbasins consistent with existing U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Hydrologie Unit 
Codes (HUCs). In the simulations presented in Chapter 6 this has been done for the 
Raccoon river watershed, with subbasins geographically equivalent to 10-digit HUCs. 
The Raccoon watershed consists of two eight-digit HUCs. HUCs are used to organize 
watersheds in a hierarchy, with shorter length HUCs denoting larger watersheds. For 
example, the Raccoon watershed HUCs are 07100006 and 07100007, while the Upper 
Mississippi is 07; the Raccoon watersheds are subbasins of the Upper Mississippi. Like­
wise subbasins of the Raccoon would begin with 07100006 or 07100007 but have a longer 
HUG. 
For land cover, soil, and land management characteristics, there is no explicit spatial 
variability in SWAT. To account for variability, it makes use of "virtual sub-subbasins" 
within each subbasin, called Hyrdologic Response Units (HRUs). These HRUs represent 
unique combinations of the primary characteristics. A simplified example of an HRU 
designation would be a given soil type, percentage of land in a certain crop or crop 
1SWAT uses digital elevation map information to create subbasins 
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rotation, and a particular level of nutrient application. Another HRU might have that 
same soil type but be forested rather than cropland and unmanaged in terms of crop or 
chemical application. In the simulations described in Chapter 4.3, the Raccoon water­
shed has 4,530 HRUs, with each subbasin containing anywhere from 80 to 267 HRUs. 
Subbasins with greater internal variation require more HRUs to capture that variability, 
while those with less variation can be simulated with fewer HRUs. Some land use com­
binations that make up a very small proportion of the overall land use are discarded, 
but the HRUs cover nearly all of the observed land use combinations. The data used 
to determine HRU designations for subbasins is derived from the National Resources 
Inventory (NRI). More details concerning the use of this data for SWAT simulations can 
be found in Chapter 4.1, and a complete description of HRUs and their use in the model 
are available in the SWAT documentation ( [41] ). The NRI data as it relates to SWAT 
inputs is also discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
SWAT is a continuous-time model in that calculations are performed on a day-by-
day basis, and it is designed as a long-term yield model. As it is not currently possible 
to model scenarios that change by year, simulations use one target year's prices to 
determine nutrient application behavior. Since the 1997 NRI data is used for many of 
the model inputs, SWAT is run for* several years before and after 1997 and the results 
of a "snapshot" of the output from that year are examined. 
5.4 Inputs and outputs 
This section provides an overview of the type and variety of inputs required to run 
SWAT as well as the output that SWAT generates. A very useful interface for manip­
ulating SWAT runs, called i_swat2, has been developed at Iowa State University. This 
software allows for quick and easy manipulation of input files via a standard Microsoft 
2i_swat is available for download at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~elvis/i_swat_main.html 
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Access database and organizes all of the inputs needed into one file that can be used as 
a reference. In particular, the ability to directly control the land management files is 
important in implementing policy scenario driven changes. 
Inputs 
The general set of inputs required to run SWAT fall into five major categories: topog­
raphy, weather, land use, soil, and management data. Topographical data is used to de­
lineate the overall watershed into subbasins and also to provide slope-related parameters 
for the model. The data used for the simulations herein was sourced as a 90-meter reso­
lution Digital Elevation Model from a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
called Better Assessment Science Intergrating point and Nonpoint Sources (BASINS).3 
SWAT also requires daily climate information for each subbasin. The variables 
needed include precipitation amount, maximum and minimum ambient air tempera­
ture, solar radiation, wind speed, and relative humidity. A built-in weather generator4 
is provided, but it is also possible to utilize actual historical weather data. The latter 
has been done here in the case of precipitation and temperature, making use of data 
from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). This data is available for ten weather 
stations either in or adjoining the Raccoon watershed. SWAT's internal weather gener­
ator was used for the other required weather inputs, as were some missing precipitation 
and temperature values in the NCDC data. 
The HRU subdivisions discussed above make use of land use, soil, and management 
data. These inputs were derived primarily from the 1997 NRI. The cropping histories 
provided in the NRI are used directly in SWAT. Soil layer information is obtained via a 
matchup process between NRI points and a soil database described in Baumer [8]. This 
database includes identification codes that allow the linking of its soil properties to NRI 
3See USEPA reference for download and other information. 
4The weather generator uses records on long-term climate statistics for its simulations. 
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points. 
Tillage data is generated from a model that combines data from the USDA Cropping 
Practices Survey (CPS) and the Conservation Tillage Information Center (CTIC). 
Output from simulations of the economic model described in Chapters 3 and 4 is 
used to construct the fertilizer rates needed. Based on input prices, output price, and 
soil type, each NRI point has associated with it an application rate for nitrogen and 
phosphorus. From this baseline, fertilizer subfiles are modified according to the results 
of economic model simulations and the resulting SWAT runs used to compare policies. 
Outputs 
SWAT provides three general categories of output: flow, sediment load, and nutrient 
load. Flow is of peripheral interest here, as is sediment (except as it relates to phosphorus 
loads). Nitrogen and phoshphorus loads are the main indicators of water quality and it 
is their levels which are of primary interest. SWAT simulates a complete nutrient cycle 
for both nutrients. 
The nitrogen cycle is simulated via five pools: two inorganic forms (ammonium and 
nitrate) and three organic forms (fresh, stable, and active). In the case of phospho­
rus, SWAT tracks six phosphorus pools in soil, three organic and three inorganic forms. 
Both nutrient cycles take into account mineralization, decomposition, and immobiliza­
tion, with these processes allowed only when sufficient soil temperatures are reached. 
Calculations of nitrate export in the form of runoff, lateral flow, and percolation take 
into account the volume of water and average soil concentration of nitrate. A loading 
function handles organic nitrogen and phosphorus and estimates daily nutrient runoff 
loss based on concentrations in topsoil, sediment yield, and an enrichment ration. A more 
detailed description of the mechanics of nutrient transport and other output generation 
is available in the SWAT Theoretical Documentation. 
SWAT reports all outputs variables at the subbasin level. Annual output values for 
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a baseline model run of the Raccoon watershed can be found in Table B.l of Appendix 
A. A description of the variables reported follows: 
1. Subbasin number (see Figure 5.3 for subbasin numbering). 
2. Subbasin area (in square kilometers). 
3. Flow (in cubic meters per second at the subbasin outlet). 
4. Sediment (in tons per unit time, monthly or yearly). 
5. Organic nitrogen (in kilograms per unit time). 
6. Organic phosphorus (in kilograms per unit time). 
7. NO3 as nitrogen (in kilograms per unit time). 
8. NH4 as nitrogen (in kilograms per unit time). 
9. Mineral phosphorus (in kilograms per unit time). 
Total nitrogen and total phosphorus can be calculated by summing individual nutri­
ent load contributions. These values and their constituents form the basis for policy 
comparisons in terms of water quality effects. 
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6. POLICY SCENARIO SIMULATIONS 
This section catalogs the results of 10-year SWAT simulation runs (1994-2003) on 
the Raccoon watershed. These runs vary only by nutrient application rates—weather, 
land management, and other input variables are identical. The output values reported 
are for 1997, the year from which the NRI observations used to construct the land-use 
and nutrient inputs are drawn. 
Driving the SWAT runs are simulations of the economic model presented in Chapter 3 
and estimated in Chapter 4; the interface of those modeling results and SWAT are 
as described in Chapter 5. Results from the NRI-based economic simulations provide 
disaggregated farm-level information for each scenario and nutrient application rates 
which are used for SWAT runs. This farm-level information can be aggregated through 
the NRI-point-specific expansion factor to arrive at watershed-level estimates of the 
economic impacts of each scenario, for example, total expected returns, total tax revenue 
(under a nutrient input tax policy). 
A baseline scenario run is used as a reference to which each policy outcome can 
be compared. Ideally, the parameter(s) defining each policy scenario (e.g., a tax rate) 
would be tailored to result in identical water-quality outcomes. Given the complexity 
of SWAT, this is an extremely difficult task requiring extensive trial-and-error testing. 
The alternative, followed here, is to fix the watershed cost (the change in aggregate 
net returns from nutrient application) and compare the relative water-quality changes 
associated with each scenario. To accomplish this, one scenario is used as a benchmark. 
Not to be confused with the baseline, the benchmark is one policy scenario that is used 
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to fix the change in aggregate net returns so that the policies can be compared to one 
another. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.1 provides a general description of 
the scenarios that will be analyzed and Section 6.2 presents a detailed summary of the 
baseline economic models and SWAT runs. Section 6.3 covers the entire set of scenarios 
run using the economic model of Section 3.2. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the overall results in Section 6.4. 
6.1 Scenario overview 
Policy simulations are run using the economic model described in Section 3.2. Six 
sets of policies are considered at different reduction levels: 10% reduction in nitrogen 
application, 10% reduction in phosphorus, 10% reduction in both nitrogen and phos­
phorus, 20% reduction in nitrogen, 20% reduction in phosphorus, and 20% reduction 
in both nitrogen and phosphorus. These six percentage reduction policies will serve as 
the benchmarks for the other policy scenarios described below: a cap on per-acre ap­
plication rates, a tax on the nutrient(s), and a cap-and-trade nutrient application right 
trading scheme. For scenarios in which both nutrients are simultaneously targeted some 
decisions must be made as to how to set the policy instrument (tax rate, cap level, et 
cetera); the procedures chosen are described in Section 6.3 below. The following is a 
description of the specific policies. 
10 % Uniform reduction Application of the nutrient(s) at each NRI corn point is 
reduced by 10%. This scenario is used as a benchmark—the aggregate watershed 
net returns associated with it are used to determine the parameter(s) of the other 
scenarios. 
20% Uniform reduction Application of the nutrient(s) at each point is reduced by 
20%. This scenario is used as a benchmark for a second set of larger reductions. 
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Application cap A maximum per-acre allowable application of the nutrient is imposed. 
Farms applying at or below the cap are not affected relative to the baseline, but 
those applying above the cap are constrained and suffer a loss in net returns. 
The cap is chosen such that resulting aggregate net returns equal those under the 
uniform reduction scenario. 
Nutrient tax A per-pound tax is imposed on the nutrient(s). For purposes of calcu­
lating aggregate returns, tax revenues are included in the total for the watershed. 
A tax rate resulting in this total being equal to the net returns associated with 
the uniform reduction scenario is used. 
Application permit trading A fixed number of per-acre application permits is allot­
ted to each farm (the total number of permits per farm is based on acreage). Farms 
are allowed to buy and sell these permits on a market depending on whether it 
is optimal for them to apply below or above their permit allotment. The alloca­
tion of permits is chosen to result in a market-clearing permit price that leads to 
watershed net returns equivalent to those under the uniform reduction scenario. 
Combination policies Policies simultaneously targeting both nutrients are also ex­
amined. These require a choice to be made regarding the allocation of reductions 
between nutrients when choosing instrument levels under a fixed change in net 
returns. For the application cap scenarios, this was done by holding the ratio of 
N to P caps constant at the same ratio seen between mean N and P under the 
relevant uniform reduction. For the tax scenarios the tax rate was simply held 
to be the same percentage on both nutrients. The resulting per-pound input tax 
rates were used to set permit prices in the permit trading scenarios. 
For accuracy in recording the output results, each scenario is assigned a code or 
name. Table 6.1 illustrates the 24 different policy scenarios that will be examined and 
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Table 6.1 Matrix of policy scenario labels 
Policy instrument 
Benchmark Reduction Uniform Tax Cap Trade 
10% N 01 02 03 02t 
10% P 04 05 - 06 05t 
20% N 07 08 09 08t 
20% P 10 11 12 lit 
10% N and 10% P 13 14 15 14t 
20% N and 20% P 16 17 18 17t 
the names they are assigned. In terms of nutrient input levels, the "Nutrient tax" and 
"Application permit trading" scenarios will appear identical to SWAT even though they 
differ in economic effect. For this reason the trading scenarios are distinguished by 
adding the letter "t" to the code for each tax scenario. There are 18 distinct SWAT 
runs. 
6.2 Baseline 
This section describes the baseline conditions for the economic and physical mod­
els. Table 6.2 reports information related to the NRI corn points used to construct the 
baseline SWAT run from inputs of the economic model. The aggregate measures (wa­
tershed returns to nutrient application and total nutrient applications) are arrived at by 
multiplying the variables of interest at each NRI point by the point's expansion factor. 
Table 6.2 Baseline input data 
Mean N application (lbs./acre) 135.48 
Mean P application (lbs./acre) 66.17 
Mean yield (bu/acre) 152.41 
Mean returns to nutrient application ($/acre) $298.58 
Total N application (tons) 62,711 
Total P application (tons) 30,630 
Watershed Returns ($) $305,565,012 
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Table 6.3 displays the results of the baseline SWAT run, which applies the simulated 
nutrient application information summarized in Table 6.2. Values are annual totals for 
1997 in a ten-year run measured at the outlet of the watershed, located in subbasin 25 
(see the map in Figure 5.3). 
Table 6.3 Baseline SWAT output 
Flow (m3/s) 64.94 
Sediment (tons) 358,800 
Sediment concentration (mg/kg) 56.63 
Organic N (kg) 6,320,000 
Organic P (kg) 829,900 
N03 (kg) 7,527,000 
Mineral P (kg) 2,049,000 
Total N (kg) 18,787,000 
Total P (kg) 2,878,900 
SWAT output can also be tabulated at the subbasin level (10-digit HUG level). 
The baseline SWAT run output at this level can be found in Appendix B, Table B.l. 
Changes at the subbasin level are of principal interest when evaluating policies that 
target phosphorus, as it is the nutrient of interest for localized water quality problems. 
6.3 Simulation results 
This section describes simulations of the policy scenarios outlined in Section 6.1. 
Detailed information on the characteristics of both input from the economic model and 
output from SWAT is contained in Appendix B and a summary is presented here. Ta­
ble 6.4 describes SWAT output via percentage changes in target nutrients relative to the 
baseline. It also provides information on the net loss in returns to nutrient application 
for each scenario. 
The scenarios are grouped by nutrient target and reduction level. Of primary interest 
in "global" (entire watershed) water quality are nitrate levels, as this is the primary 
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Table 6.4 Simulation Summary-
Change Change in Cost Cost/Ton Cost/Ton 
Scenario in NO3 Mineral P of policy of N input of P input 
Baseline 
10% N -5.94% 0.10% $161,269 $25.72 
10-N Tax/Trading -6.70% -0.44% $161,270 $25.64 
10-N Cap -7.08% -0.24% $161,270 $31.76 
10% P -0.24% -2.34% $97,053 $31.69 
10-P Tax/Trading -0.60% -2.15% $97,055 $31.59 
10-P Cap -0.17% -1.90% $97,046 $39.14 
20% N -13.06% -0.39% $693,666 $55.31 
20-N Tax/Trading -13.15% -1.12% $693,654 $55.15 
20-N Cap -12.30% -0.29% $693,647 $64.13 
20% P 0.28% -4.44% $418,117 $68.25 
20-P Tax/Trading -1.00% -4.49% $418,130 $68.06 
20-P Cap -0.52% -3.95% $418,096 $79.17 
10% N+P -6.80% -2.64% $238,698 $38.06 $77.93 
10-NP Tax/Trading -6.27% -2.44% $238,678 $38.06 $77.93 
10-NP Cap -6.27% -2.44% $238,697 $47.03 $96.07 
20% N+P -12.90% -5.08% $1,024,515 $81.69 $167.24 
20-NP Tax/Trading -12.89% -5.12% $1,024,516 $81.69 $167.24 
20-NP Cap -12.54% -4.44% $1,024,517 $94.72 $193.73 
threat to drinking water collected near the outlet of the watershed. For nitrates, response 
to policies across different reduction levels appears nearly linear. The 10%-base input 
reductions realize watershed outlet reductions of around 6% to 7% while 20%-base input 
reductions result in roughly a 12% to 13% load reduction at the outlet. Policies targeting 
phosphorus application behave in much the same way, with approximately 2% reductions 
at the outlet for lower input reductions and 5% output load reductions at the higher 20% 
level of input reduction. Changes in mineral P levels at the outlet do not necessarily 
provide a great deal of information about water quality in specific parts of the watershed, 
where it may be part of a "local" (subbasin-level) problem. This is explored in detail in 
Section 6.4 below. 
The cost associated with each policy is simply the change in returns to nutrient 
application with respect to the baseline. The change in returns is calculated for each NRI 
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point, then expanded over the entire watershed area. For scenarios involving a tax the 
revenue generated by the tax is included in determining the "new" returns. In general, 
phosphorus reductions are less costly than nitrate reductions. There are some small cost 
savings in the combined policies relative to separate nitrate and phosphorus-targeting 
policies, in addition to the slightly larger reductions achieved for both nutrients. The 
likely reason for this is that, due to the joint production impact of the two nutrients, 
expected yields are already impacted by reduction of one alone. Cost per ton of input is 
useful in comparing policies as a measure of input efficiency. However, it is the reduction 
in simulated output via SWAT that serves as the primary policy evaluation tool. 
Appendix B contains more information on values used to compute some of the infor­
mation reported in Table 6.4 and details on output from both the economic and SWAT 
models. Tables B.2 and B.3 report the main characteristics of the economic model and 
its simulations. Tables B.4 and B.5 provide detailed SWAT output measured at the 
watershed outlet for all of the scenarios. 
6.4 Discussion 
There are several interesting and notable features of these simulations. Among the 
more striking are the results for nitrogen reduction at the 10% level, summaries of which 
appear in the first three rows of Table 6.4. Although the application cap is the least 
efficient on the input side at a cost of $31.76 per ton of N input versus the uniform 
and tax/trading policies at $25.72 and $25.64, it achieves the greatest reduction in 
nitrate loading. This is likely due to spatial arrangement of points that are applying 
high nitrogen levels. With a large enough number of farms in runoff-susceptible areas 
applying at high levels, the cap is more efficient on the output side because these farms 
have a disproportionate influence on in-stream nutrient levels. 
This result does not carry over to phosphorus targeting scenarios nor does it appear 
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in the larger reductions. In the latter case it may be that stricter caps affect a larger 
portion of the sample and the spatial location of the heavy applications does not have 
the effect it does with looser caps. 
However, in the instance of 10% N reductions the degree to which the cap is superior 
to other policies is not extremely large. Across policies (but within reduction levels) 
results do not vary greatly. This characteristic of the results is actually quite useful and 
suggests that the choice of policy in not necessarily critical, at least as it relates to loss 
of returns and water quality outcomes. 
Another important characterstic of these policy simulations is not apparent from 
the watershed-scale results presented above. There is a great deal of spatial variation 
within and across scenarios at the subbasin level. This is of particular importance in 
examining policies targeting phosphorus application, as levels of that nutrient are the 
limiting factor in subbasin-scale or local water quality problems, particularly in lakes. 
The remainder of this chapter presents simulation outcomes at the subbasin level for 
phosphorus reductions. 
Table 6.5 10-P Tax/trading scenario subbasin results 
Subbasin Scenario 05 Subbasin Scenario 05 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
-3.60% 
-3.54% 
-3.80% 
-2.87% 
-4.34% 
-4.81% 
-3.08% 
-4.24% 
-2.61% 
-4.81% 
-3.87% 
-3.36% 
-3.70% 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-4.06% 
-2.41% 
-3.15% 
-3.64% 
-2.46% 
-3.69% 
-2.70% 
-3.78% 
-3.31% 
-2.30% 
-5.92% 
-2.15% 
-2.96% 
Table 6.5 lists the percentage changes in mineral P calculated at each subbasin's 
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Percentage 
Reductions 
CO 1 to -5% 
-5 to -4% 
-4 to -3% 
I CO
 
to -2% 
m 
Figure 6.1 Subbasin-level Mineral P reductions, 10-P tax/trading scenario 
outlet. While the outlet of the entire watershed (subbasin 25) indicates only a 2.15% 
reduction in load, it is apparent that much larger reductions occur in other parts of 
the watershed. There are several subbasins enjoying nearly 5% or greater reductions, 
and the watershed outlet appears to be one of the worst-performing areas. Figure 6.1 
is a spatial representation of the information in Table 6.5 and shows which parts of 
the watershed experience smaller or larger reductions under the policy. There is some 
tendency for load reductions to be smaller near the outlet of the watershed, but even in 
lower reaches there can be larger reductions, for example in subbbasin 24. 
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Several subbasins contains lakes that experience varying states of impairment. Ta­
ble 6.6 draws information from the Iowa Department of Natural Resources 303(d) lists 
of impaired waters [24], [25] and a water quality survey of Iowa's lakes [13]. These six 
lakes are each located within one of the 26 subbasins in the watershed, and the SWAT 
subbasin results can serve as an indicator of possible changes in water quality in the 
associated lake. The percentile rank rates each lake relative to others in Iowa—lower 
rank is poorer water quality. All of the lakes have been on the official lists of impaired 
waters (the absence of some in the 2004 list does not indicate that they are no longer 
impaired) and two have established TMDLs. 
Table 6.6 Impairment rank of lakes in the Raccoon watershed 
Listed in 
Percentile Subbasin 2002, 2004 
Lake rank location 303(d) TMDL 
Swan Lake 1 16 yes, no algae, turbidity 
Black Hawk Lake 20 5 yes, yes none 
Storm Lake 40 1 yes, yes turbidity 
North Twin Lake 43 7 yes, no none 
Springbrook Lake 60 18 yes, no none 
Spring Lake 66 12 yes, yes none 
Table 6.7 Scenario results for lakes in the watershed, mineral P reductions 
Subbasin 
Lake location Scenario 04 Scenario 05 Scenario 06 
Swan Lake 16 -3.75% -3.15% -2.92% 
Black Hawk Lake 5 -4.17% -4.34% -3.35% 
Storm Lake 1 -3.54% -3.60% -2.94% 
North Twin Lake 7 -4.85% -3.08% -3.89% 
Springbrook Lake 18 -3.14% -2.46% -2.46% 
Spring Lake 12 -3.65% -3.36% -2.79% 
Table 6.7 lists the SWAT output associated with the three 10%-P reduction scenarios. 
There is a range of changes, but Swan Lake, the worst on the list in terms of impairment, 
has one of the smallest phosphorus reductions. North Twin Lake, near the middle of 
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the quality distribution for Iowa lakes, enjoys the greatest reductions. Interestingly, 
Scenario 04 (the uniform reduction) yields the greatest reduction for several of these 
subbasins/lake areas. For the rest of the lakes, however, the tax/trade policy (Scenario 
05) gives the greatest subbasin reductions. 
A full table of subbasin mineral P results are available in Appendix B, Table B.6 
with accompanying maps in Figures B.l through B.4. In some, there is a great deal of 
spatial variability across like-reduction policies, but in others there is very little. This 
is likely due to characteristics of the policy implementation that shift (or do not shift) 
the distribution of reductions across the input sample. 
86 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As major nonpoint contributors to impaired waters, agricultural application of ni­
trogen and phosphorus has an important impact on water quality. Because of this, 
development and analysis of policies designed to ameliorate nutrient-related water im­
pairment is essential. This paper has presented a useful approximation of the effects of 
several possible policy avenues in the context of an actual watershed using both a hydro-
logical model of nutrient transport in water and an economic model of policy impacts 
on agricultural production. 
Summary of results 
The costs of achieving nutrient reductions in the Raccoon watershed vary depending 
on the goal. Reductions of around 2% in phosphorus loads at the watershed outlet can 
be achieved by an approximate 10% decrease in phosphorus applications throughout 
the watershed under the most efficient policy. This comes at an estimated watershed-
wide loss of nearly $100,000 in returns to nutrient application. There is a great deal 
of spatial variability in results within the watershed. Phosphorus reductions at the lo­
cal or subbasin level can near 6% even when whole-watershed outlet reductions are in 
the 2% range. At larger levels of input reduction (roughly 20% reduction in whole-
watershed application) greater decreases in phosphorus loads are realized. Watershed 
outlet improvements are in the area of 5% but subbasin improvements can attain over 
10% reductions in phosphorus loading when the scale of analysis is the subbasin. The es-
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timated watershed costs of this level of phosphorus reduction are slightly over $400,000-
more than four times the cost of the smaller reduction. At the watershed outlet, poli­
cies involving a phosphorus tax or permit trading system are consistently more efficient 
than competing policies. This is not always the case when results are examined at the 
subbasin level. 
Nitrate reduction policies are in general more costly but achieve larger percentage 
improvements in watershed outlet nitrate loading. An approximate 10% reduction in 
nitrogen application on the watershed leads to an estimated improvement of about 7% 
in nitrate load at the watershed outlet using the most efficient policy. Interestingly, the 
most efficient policy in terms of achieving nitrate reductions (an application rate cap) 
is not the most efficient in cost of input reduction. The cap is the most "expensive" 
in terms of the average cost of reducing a pound of nitrate application, but due to the 
spatial characteristics of the simulation sample, it achieves superior results at the outlet. 
Watershed-wide loss of returns at this level of input reduction is in the neighborhood 
of $160,000. Doubling the reductions in nitrogen application results in load reductions 
nearing 13% at the outlet under the most efficient policy, but with costs increasing 
to nearly $700,000. At these higher reduction levels, the application cap no longer 
dominates other policy options. 
Policy scenarios that simultaneously target both nutrients are also considered. At 
low (10% input reduction) and high (20% input reduction) levels there are cost savings 
as compared to reducing only one nutrient. Reductions at the outlet are comparable or 
slightly superior to one-nutrient policies. A simultaneous 10% input reduction of nitrogen 
and phosphorus results in under $250,000 million in watershed losses while nitrogen and 
phosphorus-alone policy costs combine to over $250,000. The latter provides slightly 
inferior watershed outlet reductions for both nutrients. At the higher 20% reduction 
levels, the simultaneous policies are superior in cost (roughly $1 million for the watershed 
versus over $1.1 million) and outlet reductions. 
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Policy choice 
These results have several implications for policy choice. First, there is relatively little 
variation in watershed outlet changes within policies given a fixed watershed cost level. 
Although some policies do offer slightly better performance than others, the difference 
in performance is not large. This suggests that other criteria can easily play a role in 
the choice of policy. For example, if an application rate cap is the easiest to implement 
but not necessarily the most efficient, very little will likely be lost if it is chosen in favor 
of an input tax or application right trading system. 
Another important implication of the results is that the scale of analysis can play a 
major role. In the case of phosphorus reductions, small improvements at the watershed 
outlet do not tell the whole story. Improvements at the subbasin level are not only 
larger but also provide more information on localized water quality which is actually of 
more interest than at the full watershed scale due to the localized problems phosphorus 
loads create. This underlines the importance of modeling at a scale appropriate to the 
water quality changes needed or desired. Likewise, what may at first glance appear to 
be lackluster results can turn out to provide greater insight at other scales of analysis. 
Future directions 
There are many improvements and extensions that could be made to the analyses 
presented here. One assumption made in the construction of the economic model is 
that land-use change decisions are exogenous. Examples of these decisions are tillage 
method, crop rotation and use of other conservation practices such as grassed waterways. 
Modeling these jointly with nutrient application decisions would require a more complex 
economic model but would likely provide more flexibility for water quality improvements 
by supplying additional policy instruments. Water quality results would also improve 
when nutrient application reductions are combined with increased use of conservation 
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practices. 
Another application for this modeling framework is the allocation of nutrient reduc­
tions between point and nonpoint sources. The Raccoon watershed does not contain any 
large point sources of either nutrient, but the Des Moines Water Works does engage in 
costly nitrate reduction activity. The cost of 10% nitrate reductions is very close to the 
approximate annual nitrate scrubbing costs, suggesting an opportunity for an efficient 
tradeoff. It is possible that nitrate reductions could be more cheaply achieved by a 
combination of changes in agricultural application and the operation of nitrate removal 
filters. This would require a slightly different approach to the physical model, one which 
would deal with the peak nutrient events that trigger the need for nitrate removal. 
A direct extension of the methods presented here is the application of the models to 
other watersheds. The approach is easily adapted to other watersheds in Iowa and with 
additional data could be applied to other parts of the corn belt with little modification. 
The general idea of aggregating nonpoint sources from a point-based economic model to 
a watershed-level analysis is an attractive proposition and could be employed in many 
analyses of nonpoint problems. Again, availability of data may pose significant challenges 
depending on the scale of the problem and the nature of the non point sources. 
A final possibility is a move to a dynamic framework. This would require a change 
in the way SWAT uses input files, as it is currently not designed to take more than one 
value over its run time for nutrient inputs. It may be possible to temporally daisy-chain 
SWAT runs with inputs that evolve over time, but this will require a great deal of testing 
and increase computational time and complexity. 
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APPENDIX A. DATA SET DETAILS 
A.l Fertilizer Prices 
Table A.l Fertilizer blend prices in $/ton for North Central region (IL, IN, 
IA, MN, OH, MO), 1996-2001 
Year 
Blend 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
0-15-40 186 182 189 195 183 189 
3-10-30 170 164 165 178 168 173 
6-24-24 232 225 228 233 223 222 
8-32-16 249 240 235 234 224 225 
9-23-30 220 210 214 215 202 208 
10-20-10 207 217 206 200 202 202 
10-34-0 252 251 254 252 244 261 
11-52-0 307 278 273 272 249 251 
13-13-13 223 223 210 208 209 235 
16-0-13 171 175 160 131 176 185 
18-46-0 (DAP) 297 277 266 267 243 247 
19-19-19 244 232 218 217 210 235 
Ammonium Nitrate 220 218 179 168 181 243 
Anhydrous Ammonia 309 314 256 211 231 408 
Nitrogen Solution, 28% 171 153 129 118 121 202 
Nitrogen Solution, 32% 183 176 145 132 136 224 
Sulfate of Ammonia 182 181 179 174 174 189 
Urea 274 257 194 176 197 284 
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Table A.2 Distribution of fertilizer sales by blend, most popular straight 
materials 
Blend (N-P-K) 
Total Tons 
2002-2003 
Total Tons 
2003-2004 
82-0-0 564,635 646,954 
34-0-0 21,365 21,865 
21-0-0 10,326 12,914 
12-0-0 7,593 8,334 
46-0-0 235,291 242,306 
28-0-0 396,329 374,274 
32-0-0 405,687 572,844 
8-24-0 8,835 8,957 
10-34-0 41,066 41,478 
11-52-0 208,105 229,773 
18-46-0 408,989 465,795 
0-46-0 3,513 4,552 
0-0-61 775,038 958,577 
Source: http://www.agriculture.state.ia.us/fertilizertonreport.htm 
Table A.3 Distribution of fertilizer sales by blend, most popular blends 
Total Tons Total Tons 
Blend (N-P-K) 2002-2003 2003-2004 
2-6-35 20,816 22,912 
3-10-30 22,119 22,337 
3-18-18 1,721 1,384 
4-10-10 4,996 6,196 
6-24-6 4,137 3,236 
7-18-6 3,545 3,134 
7-21-7 5,375 4,907 
8-19-3 2,229 2,046 
9-18-9 4,185 5,814 
9-23-30 2,162 1,976 
10-34-8 2,931 
13-13-13 1,396 1,276 
28-3-3 1,246 1,690 
*data not available for 2003-2004 
Source: http://www.agriculture.state.ia.us/fertilizertonreport.htm 
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Output Prices 
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Table A.4 Corn prices, 1996-2001, Adair through Jasper counties 
County 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Adair 2.55 2.25 1.86 1.75 1.73 1.91 
Adams 2.53 2.19 1.72 1.71 1.67 1.89 
Allamakee 2.75 2.39 1.98 1.80 1.88 1.97 
Appanoose 2.61 2.35 1.91 1.71 1.71 1.91 
Audubon 2.57 2.35 1.79 1.66 1.68 1.84 
Benton 2.72 2.52 2.01 1.85 1.84 1.99 
Black Hawk 2.71 2.45 1.95 1.81 1.83 1.92 
Boone 2.56 2.27 1.82 1.62 1.66 1.82 
Bremer 2.64 2.35 1.88 1.76 1.75 1.92 
Buchanan 2.62 2.44 1.84 1.76 1.85 1.92 
Buena Vista 2.45 2.23 1.83 1.62 1.69 1.85 
Butler 2.61 2.39 1.88 1.73 1.75 1.89 
Calhoun 2.57 2.34 1.80 1.66 1.71 1.83 
Carroll 2.52 2.29 1.81 1.72 1.70 1.82 
Cass 2.59 2.30 1.81 1.67 1.76 1.90 
Cedar 2.72 2.50 1.96 1.81 1.89 1.97 
Cerro Gordo 2.47 2.30 1.79 1.70 1.65 1.84 
Cherokee 2.58 2.29 1.80 1.62 1.64 1.82 
Chickasaw 2.65 2.29 1.88 1.73 1.74 1.89 
Clarke 2.52 2.31 1.82 1.67 1.81 1.96 
Clay 2.47 2.24 1.77 1.60 1.71 1.87 
Clayton 2.66 2.37 1.92 1.74 1.83 1.93 
Clinton 2.76 2.46 2.01 1.85 1.85 2.00 
Crawford 2.45 2.24 1.80 1.68 1.73 1.85 
Dallas 2.58 2.32 1.87 1.69 1.70 1.87 
Davis 2.70 2.46 1.89 1.75 1.75 1.94 
Decatur 2.52 2.34 1.81 1.69 1.75 1.90 
Delaware 2.77 2.38 1.95 1.80 1.85 1.91 
Des Moines 2.79 2.49 2.05 1.81 1.88 2.03 
Dickinson 2.51 2.29 1.80 1.65 1.66 1.87 
Dubuque 2.68 2.38 1.94 1.77 1.85 1.98 
Emmet 2.53 2.28 1.71 1.63 1.66 1.86 
Fayette 2.63 2.35 1.84 1.79 1.84 1.98 
Floyd 2.58 2.30 1.85 1.72 1.65 1.88 
Franklin 2.45 2.25 1.80 1.69 1.74 1.86 
Fremont 2.77 2.40 1.90 1.80 1.83 1.98 
Greene 2.50 2.28 1.81 1.66 1.68 1.85 
Grundy 2.53 2.30 1.90 1.67 1.76 1.89 
Guthrie 2.66 2.35 1.86 1.66 1.71 1.86 
Hamilton 2.51 2.21 1.78 1.66 1.69 1.82 
Hancock 2.51 2.24 1.83 1.69 1.71 1.86 
Hardin 2.51 2.31 1.88 1.69 1.74 1.87 
Harrison 2.62 2.38 1.82 1.69 1.67 1.85 
Henry 2.70 2.45 2.02 1.86 1.84 2.05 
Howard 2.59 2.30 1.85 1.77 1.70 1.89 
Humboldt 2.63 2.33 1.78 1.72 1.72 1.88 
Ida 2.48 2.25 1.86 1.62 1.71 1.82 
Iowa 2.65 2.44 2.01 1.80 1.87 1.97 
Jackson 2.72 2.44 1.98 1.76 1.83 1.99 
Jasper 2.66 2.37 1.93 1.74 1.78 1.93 
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Table A.5 Corn prices, 1996-2001, Jefferson through Wright counties 
County 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Jefferson 2.77 2.45 1.98 1.81 1.81 2.00 
Johnson 2.73 2.43 1.98 1.87 1.79 1.98 
Jones 2.61 2.41 1.94 1.83 1.86 1.99 
Keokuk 2.79 2.45 2.00 1.78 1.86 2.02 
Kossuth 2.48 2.23 1.75 1.68 1.70 1.88 
Lee 2.72 2.51 1.99 1.86 1.96 2.11 
Linn 2.81 2.58 1.91 1.77 1.88 2.01 
Louisa 2.80 2.52 2.03 1.81 1.96 2.11 
Lucas 2.68 2.32 1.92 1.71 1.96 2.12 
Lyon 2.46 2.22 1.70 1.59 1.61 1.83 
Madison 2.49 2.29 1.78 1.67 1.77 1.90 
Mahaska 2.80 2.44 1.89 1.78 1.88 2.03 
Marion 2.65 2.29 1.78 1.70 1.79 1.94 
Marshall 2.75 2.43 1.90 1.75 1.76 1.89 
Mills 2.62 2.33 1.81 1.75 1.70 1.90 
Mitchell 2.69 2.33 1.79 1.70 1.72 1.89 
Monona 2.54 2.28 1.74 1.62 1.67 1.81 
Monroe 2.58 2.36 1.90 1.71 1.96 2.08 
Montgomery 2.55 2.23 1.78 1.66 1.74 1.88 
Muscatine 2.71 2.48 1.97 1.76 1.90 1.98 
O'Brien 2.50 2.25 1.77 1.61 1.68 1.88 
Osceola 2.51 2.29 1.71 1.61 1.69 1.89 
Page 2.66 2.34 1.91 1.82 1.78 1.96 
Palo Alto 2.56 2.28 1.80 1.71 1.75 1.89 
Plymouth 2.55 2.25 1.80 1.59 1.71 1.86 
Pocahontas 2.52 2.30 1.79 1.67 1.71 1.88 
Polk 2.56 2.33 1.91 1.73 1.71 1.87 
Pottawattamie 2.51 2.20 1.81 1.75 1.74 1.90 
Poweshiek 2.54 2.34 1.91 1.77 1.75 1.91 
Ringgold 2.56 2.34 1.79 1.79 1.87 2.02 
Sac 2.53 2.27 1.79 1.61 1.71 1.81 
Scott 2.76 2.47 1.95 1.82 1.89 2.01 
Shelby 2.54 2.29 1.73 1.68 1.69 1.80 
Sioux 2.57 2.27 1.77 1.63 1.71 1.85 
Story 2.60 2.33 1.87 1.70 1.71 1.88 
Tama 2.64 2.42 2.01 1.78 1.82 1.95 
Taylor 2.52 2.18 1.83 1.78 1.75 1.89 
Union 2.56 2.27 1.83 1.71 1.79 1.96 
Van Buren 2.82 2.50 1.92 1.79 1.85 2.00 
Wapello 2.66 2.36 1.88 1.73 1.78 1.96 
Warren 2.65 2.32 1.86 1.69 1.77 1.92 
Washington 2.72 2.42 1.99 1.78 1.78 1.97 
Wayne 2.48 2.28 1.82 1.66 1.71 1.90 
Webster 2.60 2.29 1.81 1.71 1.66 1.82 
Winnebago 2.53 2.23 1.84 1.69 1.72 1.88 
Winneshiek 2.72 2.39 1.95 1.76 1.72 1.90 
Woodbury 2.53 2.27 1.78 1.61 1.68 1.81 
Worth 2.52 2.30 1.83 1.69 1.73 1.87 
Wright 2.58 2.29 1.82 1.63 1.71 1.87 
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Table A.6 Soybean prices, 1996-2001, Adair through Jasper counties 
County 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Adair 7.30 6.26 4.78 4.60 4.55 4.36 
Adams 7.23 6.23 4.84 4.56 4.48 4.31 
Allamakee 7.35 6.43 5.06 4.59 4.59 4.46 
Appanoose 7.32 6.31 4.78 4.46 4.41 4.30 
Audubon 7.34 6.29 4.80 4.50 4.46 4.34 
Benton 7.47 6.41 4.83 4.60 4.52 4.36 
Black Hawk 7.28 6.34 4.90 4.60 4.49 4.38 
Boone 7.28 6.32 4.82 4.57 4.49 4.36 
Bremer 7.34 6.36 4.78 4.59 4.43 4.39 
Buchanan 7.36 6.35 4.87 4.59 4.50 4.40 
Buena Vista 7.45 6.31 4.71 4.49 4.46 4.34 
Butler 7.42 6.36 4.82 4.64 4.57 4.35 
Calhoun 7.41 6.26 4.75 4.51 4.45 4.28 
Carroll 7.42 6.28 4.81 4.48 4.38 4.26 
Cass 7.30 6.32 4.77 4.60 4.51 4.33 
Cedar 7.52 6.43 4.91 4.58 4.62 4.36 
Cerro Gordo 7.26 6.39 4.79 4.64 4.58 4.38 
Cherokee 7.20 6.31 4.76 4.49 4.46 4.32 
Chickasaw 7.45 6.38 4.79 4.51 4.40 4.42 
Clarke 7.17 6.23 4.67 4.51 4.38 4.27 
Clay 7.27 6.29 4.84 4.42 4.45 4.33 
Clayton 7.27 6.33 5.02 4.56 4.49 4.42 
Clinton 7.50 6.35 4.94 4.51 4.60 4.41 
Crawford 7.18 6.27 4.87 4.55 4.35 4.16 
Dallas 7.42 6.35 4.81 4.60 4.48 4.41 
Davis 7.58 6.44 4.77 4.60 4.51 4.43 
Decatur 7.15 6.20 4.69 4.46 4.39 4.28 
Delaware 7.59 6.55 4.97 4.64 4.57 4.47 
Des Moines 7.78 6.55 4.95 4.66 4.62 4.46 
Dickinson 7.40 6.33 4.68 4.48 4.46 4.35 
Dubuque 7.44 6.51 5.03 4.62 4.55 4.43 
Emmet 7.43 6.31 4.67 4.50 4.48 4.31 
Fayette 7.31 6.31 4.91 4.61 4.56 4.44 
Floyd 7.42 6.32 4.71 4.60 4.42 4.36 
FVanklin 7.25 6.29 4.71 4.59 4.44 4.33 
Fremont 7.39 6.35 4.84 4.58 4.57 4.35 
Greene 7.34 6.30 4.80 4.55 4.49 4.35 
Grundy 7.30 6.33 4.75 4.52 4.45 4.30 
Guthrie 7.50 6.35 4.88 4.50 4.47 4.34 
Hamilton 7.43 6.34 4.71 4.48 4.45 4.33 
Hancock 7.30 6.33 4.79 4.56 4.42 4.29 
Hardin 7.27 6.33 4.81 4.51 4.46 4.33 
Harrison 7.26 6.32 4.85 4.59 4.47 4.29 
Henry 7.57 6.49 4.98 4.68 4.57 4.43 
Howard 7.24 6.28 4.77 4.59 4.42 4.43 
Humboldt 7.37 6.32 4.70 4.56 4.47 4.35 
Ida 7.30 6.28 4.91 4.48 4.43 4.30 
Iowa 7.38 6.41 4.83 4.60 4.56 4.46 
Jackson 7.39 6.40 4.92 4.54 4.50 4.39 
Jasper 7.42 6.39 4.83 4.54 4.59 4.33 
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Table A.7 Soybean prices, 1996-2001, Jefferson through Wright counties 
County 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Jefferson 7.46 6.39 4.87 4.62- 4.57 4.45 
Johnson 7.58 6.50 4.81 4.60 4.51 4.42 
Jones 7.40 6.44 4.96 4.50 4.63 4.48 
Keokuk 7.50 6.44 4.75 4.66 4.51 4.46 
Kossuth 7.38 6.29 4.68 4.51 4.47 4.37 
Lee 7.61 6.50 4.90 4.65 4.66 4.53 
Linn 7.64 6.53 4.86 4.58 4.65 4.49 
Louisa 7.79 6.46 4.96 4.66 4.63 4.43 
Lucas 7.28 6.27 4.81 4.46 4.45 4.24 
Lyon 7.21 6.22 4.66 4.46 4.37 4.22 
Madison 7.38 6.36 4.79 4.51 4.53 4.32 
Mahaska 7.54 6.33 4.80 4.62 4.64 4.49 
Marion 7.36 6.24 4.71 4.52 4.41 4.26 
Marshall 7.25 6.32 4.84 4.56 4.45 4.27 
Mills 7.32 6.37 4.83 4.60 4.53 4.37 
Mitchell 7.22 6.28 4.69 4.59 4.43 4.30 
Monona 7.21 6.27 4.82 4.55 4.44 4.28 
Monroe 7.27 6.27 4.76 4.46 4.45 4.31 
Montgomery 7.28 6.25 4.81 4.57 4.51 4.33 
Muscatine 7.69 6.46 4.83 4.68 4.56 4.48 
O'Brien 7.44 6.33 4.71 4.44 4.40 4.27 
Osceola 7.21 6.30 4.67 4.47 4.43 4.31 
Page 7.31 6.36 4.80 4.60 4.56 4.40 
Palo Alto 7.32 6.33 4.73 4.53 4.48 4.36 
Plymouth 7.16 6.27 4.88 4.46 4.48 4.34 
Pocahontas 7.40 6.30 4.69 4.52 4.50 4.36 
Polk 7.43 6.38 4.81 4.60 4.49 4.40 
Pottawattamie 7.28 6.22 4.76 4.60 4.64 4.35 
Poweshiek 7.43 6.36 4.84 4.62 4.50 4.36 
Ringgold 7.23 6.27 4.76 4.58 4.50 4.31 
Sac 7.36 6.26 4.78 4.50 4.44 4.33 
Scott 7.72 6.49 4.92 4.64 4.63 4.47 
Shelby 7.25 6.28 4.75 4.50 4.46 4.29 
Sioux 7.10 6.19 4.82 4.45 4.37 4.29 
Story 7.35 6.32 4.74 4.51 4.47 4.33 
Tama 7.38 6.39 4.88 4.59 4.51 4.36 
Taylor 7.21 6.21 4.75 4.64 4.56 4.36 
Union 7.28 6.26 4.80 4.46 4.45 4.29 
Van Buren 7.81 6.55 4.83 4.63 4.52 4.46 
Wapello 7.61 6.42 4.81 4.54 4.49 4.43 
Warren 7.20 6.21 4.85 4.47 4.50 4.29 
Washington 7.49 6.43 4.83 4.65 4.54 4.46 
Wayne 7.01 6.18 4.68 4.48 4.35 4.22 
Webster 7.39 6.32 4.74 4.53 4.48 4.32 
Winnebago 7.33 6.29 4.81 4.59 4.47 4.34 
Winneshiek 7.32 6.39 4.92 4.56 4.49 4.45 
Woodbury 7.23 6.26 4.79 4.45 4.42 4.31 
Worth 7.29 6.35 4.70 4.46 4.42 4.31 
Wright 7.38 6.35 4.75 4.57 4.47 4.31 
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APPENDIX B. SIMULATION RESULTS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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20 
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22 
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Table B.l Baseline model data by subwatershed, annual measures 
•ained Flow Sediment Organic N Organic P NO3 NH4 Mineral P 
(km2) (m3/s) (tons) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) 
895 10.34 716,300 1,715,000 299,300 890,300 390,200 183,500 
1,137 5.29 17,060 862,500 151,200 336,800 159,900 73,500 
220 1.18 67,380 222,300 39,560 119,500 41,730 20,540 
6,406 24.12 168,800 3,521,000 561,600 2,283,000 1,125,000 536,700 
224 1.38 95,730 307,500 55,250 188,900 48,820 23,260 
385 2.22 116,100 405,500 74,000 255,900 58,460 28,510 
331 1.89 74,030 281,600 51,630 199,600 39,640 19,810 
189 1.07 41,500 174,400 31,910 113,100 22,490 11,330 
13,550 40.90 300,300 5,329,000 809,200 4,041,000 2,022,000 1,036,000 
424 2.42 101,700 370,400 67,840 251,900 53,620 26,630 
450 4.48 276,300 836,400 151,300 378,500 149,900 75,990 
769 5.46 40,110 945,800 165,400 461,200 216,400 104,100 
196 1.95 109,700 364,400 66,190 169,200 61,170 31,370 
186 1.82 106,400 345,700 61,890 167,700 59,260 30,070 
19,800 45.23 223,300 5,018,000 706,600 4,643,000 2,335,000 1,288,000 
654 4.38 380,400 865,800 154,000 574,700 182,300 87,820 
319 3.09 224,900 611,600 109,200 276,100 109,700 53,610 
2,229 9 32 46,550 1,386,000 222,200 1,008,000 504,000 219,600 
301 1.99 78,280 276,300 51,340 207,900 37,720 20,060 
1,669 6.61 21,700 920,700 151,500 777,000 328,300 140,900 
319 2.19 137,600 244,600 46,580 233,700 36,000 17,470 
374 2.46 522,000 710,100 127,100 347,600 155,300 68,810 
7,363 19.81 117,000 2,409,000 361,200 2,242,000 924,000 509,300 
176 1.04 46,580 187,200 33,720 79,340 26,550 13,510 
36,820 65.65 358,800 6,320,000 829,900 7,527,000 3,605,000 2,049,000 
210 0.58 36,070 145,100 26,280 87,050 21,660 10,810 
CO 
oo 
Table B.2 Input scenario characteristics 
N Tax or P Tax or 
Mean Mean Mean Mean permit permit 
N app P app Yield Returns N Cap P Cap Tax price price 
Scenario (lbs/ac) (lbs/ac) (bu/ac) ($/ac) (lbs/ac) (lbs/ac) (%) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) 
Baseline 135.48 66.17 152.41 298.58 
10% N 121.93 66.17 150.92 298.42 
10-N Tax 121.89 65.49 150.83 295.49 10.00% $2.40 
10-N Cap 124.79 66.17 151.23 298.43 133.18 
10-N Trading 121.89 65.49 150.83 298.42 122.41 $2.40 
10% P 135.48 59 56 151.55 298.48 
10-P Tax 134.64 59.54 151.46 296.72 10.46% $2.96 
10-P Cap 135.48 60.95 151.73 298.49 65.05 
10-P Trading 134.64 59.54 151.46 298.48 59.79 $2.96 
20% N 108.39 66.17 149.28 297.90 
20-N Tax 108.31 64.74 149.09 292.08 22.37% $5.37 
20-N Cap 112.43 66.17 149.71 297.91 115.78 
20-N Trading 108.31 64.74 149.09 297.90 108.77 $5.37 
20% P 135.48 52.94 150.60 298.17 
20-P Tax 133.70 52.90 150.41 294.66 23.45% $6.64 
20-P Cap 135.48 54.92 150.85 298.18 56.56 
20-P Trading 133.70 52.90 150.41 298.17 53.12 $6.64 
10% N+P 121.93 59.56 150.07 298.34 
10-NP Tax 121.93 59.56 150.07 294.00 9.41% $2.26 $2.66 
10-NP Cap 124.80 60.94 150.55 298.35 133.19 65.04 
10-NP Trading 121.93 59.56 150.07 298.34 122.45 59.81 $2.26 
20% N+P 108.39 52.94 147.51 297.58 
20-NP Tax 108.39 52.94 147.51 288.97 20.98% $5.04 $5.94 
20-NP Cap 112.43 54.90 148.19 297.60 115.78 56.53 
20-NP Trading 108.39 52.94 147.51 297.58 108.84 53.16 $5.04 
Table B.3 Input scenario characteristics 
Tax Pretax N appl P appl Cost of Cost per Cost per 
Scenario Revenue returns Total returns (tons) (tons) policy ton of N ton of P 
Baseline $305,565,012 62,711 30,630 
10% N $305,403,743 56,440 30,630 $161,269 $25.72 
10-N Tax $2,993,763 $302,409,980 $305,403,742 56,421 30,314 $161,270 $25.64 
10-N Cap $305,403,742 57,633 30,630 $161,270 $31.76 
10-N Trading $305,403,742 56,421 30,314 $161,270 $ 25.64 
10% P $305,467,959 62,711 27,567 $97,053 $31.69 
10-P Tax $1,802,972 $303,664,987 $305,467,957 62,321 27,558 $97,055 $3159 
10-P Cap $305,467,966 62,711 28,151 $97,046 $39.14 
10-P Trading $305,467,957 62,321 27,558 $97,055 $3159 
20% N $304,871,346 50,169 30,630 $693,666 $ 55.31 
20-N Tax $5,950,923 $298,920,423 $304,871,358 50,132 29,964 $693,654 $ 55.15 
20-N Cap $304,871,365 51,895 30,630 $693,647 $ 64.13 
20-N Trading $304,871,358 50,132 29,964 $693,654 $55.15 
20% P $305,146,896 62,711 24,504 $418,117 $68.25 
20-P Tax $3,592,693 $301,554,202 $305,146,882 61,888 24,486 $418,130 $68.06 
20-P Cap $305,146,916 62,711 25,349 $418,096 $ 79.17 
20-P Trading $305,146,882 61,888 24,436 $418,130 $68.06 
10% N+P $305,326,314 56,440 27,567 $238,698 $38.06 $ 77.93 
10-NP Tax $4,440,891 $300,885,423 $305,326,334 56,440 27,567 $238,678 $38.06 $77.93 
10-NP Cap $305,326,315 57,636 28,145 $238,697 $ 47.03 $ 96.07 
10-NP Trading $305,326,334 56,440 27,567 $238,678 $38.06 $ 77.93 
20% N+P $304,540,497 50,169 24,504 $1,024,515 $81.69 $ 167.24 
20-NP Tax $8,802,007 $295,738,490 $304,540,496 50,169 24,504 $1,024,516 $81.69 $ 167.24 
20-NP Cap $304,540,495 51,894 25,341 $1,024,517 $ 94.72 $193.73 
20-NP Trading $304,540,496 50,169 24,504 $1,024,516 $8169 $ 167.24 
Table B.4 SWAT simulation output 
Sediment 
Flow Sediment Concentra­ Organic Organic NO3 NH4 NO2 Mineral P 
Scenario (m3/sec) (tons) tion (mg/kg) N (kg) P (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) 
Baseline 65.06 358,800 56.63 6,320,000 829,900 7,527,000 3,605,000 1,335,000 2,049,000 
10% N 65.24 361,100 56.83 6,252,000 832,200 7,080,000 3,566,000 1,325,000 2,051,000 
10-N Tax/Trading 65.28 359,700 56.69 6,214,000 829,400 7,023,000 3,546,000 1,317,000 2,040,000 
10-N Cap 65.21 360,000 56.71 6,217,000 830,200 6,994,000 3,544,000 1,317,000 2,044,000 
10% P 65.03 358,600 56.59 6,318,000 823,800 7,509,000 3,604,000 1,333,000 2,001,000 
10-P Tax/Trading 64.96 359,300 56.68 6,330,000 825,700 7,482,000 3,599,000 1,335,000 2,005,000 
10-P Cap 65.07 358,900 56.63 6,326,000 826,000 7,514,000 3,610,000 1,335,000 2,010,000 
20% N 65.35 361,000 56.82 6,130,000 830,400 6,544,000 3,483,000 1,301,000 2,041,000 
20-N Tax/Trading 65.27 359,900 56.69 6,107,000 826,000 6,537,000 3,473,000 1,297,000 2,026,000 
20-N Cap 65.44 361,100 56.82 6,151,000 831,400 6,601,000 3,497,000 1,306,000 2,043,000 
20% P 65.06 359,200 56.68 6,331,000 819,100 7,548,000 3,611,000 1,336,000 1,958,000 
20-P Tax/Trading 65.08 359,500 56.73 6,321,000 819,900 7,452,000 3,601,000 1,334,000 1,957,000 
20-P Cap 65.05 359,500 56.69 6,334,000 821,700 7,488,000 3,612,000 1,337,000 1,968,000 
10% N+P 65.19 359,900 56.70 6,208,000 822,900 7,015,000 3,531,000 1,315,000 1,995,000 
10-NP Tax/Trading 65.19 360,000 56.73 6,220,000 824,100 7,055,000 3,547,000 1,317,000 1,999,000 
10-NP Cap 65.24 360,000 56.73 6,220,000 824,100 7,055,000 3,547,000 1,317,000 1,999,000 
20% N+P 65.31 360,600 56.78 6,116,000 816,700 6,556,000 3,478,000 1,299,000 1,945,000 
20-NP Tax/Trading 65.31 360,600 56.77 6,115,000 816,700 6,557,000 3,478,000 1,299,000 1,944,000 
20-NP Cap 65.35 360,600 56.75 6,153,000 820,900 6,583,000 3,508,000 1,306,000 1,958,000 
Table B.5 Comparison of SWAT simulation output 
% change % change % change % change % change % change 
Organic N Organic P NO3 NH4 NO2 Mineral P 
Scenario (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) 
Baseline 
10% N -1.08% 0.28% -5.94% -1.08% -0.75% 0.10% 
10-N Tax/Trading -1.68% -0.06% -6.70% -1.64% -1.35% -0.44% 
10-N Cap -1.63% 0.04% -7.08% -1.69% -1.35% -0.24% 
10% P -0.03% -0.74% -0.24% -0.03% -0.15% -2.34% 
10-P Tax/Trading 0.16% -0.51% -0.60% -0.17% 0.00% -2.15% 
10-P Cap 0.09% -0.47% -0.17% 0.14% 0.00% -1.90% 
20% N -3.01% 0.06% -13.06% -3.38% -2.55% -0.39% 
20-N Tax/Trading -3.37% -0.47% -13.15% -3.66% -2.85% -1.12% 
20-N Cap -2.67% 0.18% -12.30% -3.00% -2.17% -0.29% 
20% P 0.17% -1.30% 0.28% 0.17% 0.07% -4.44% 
20-P Tax/Trading 0.02% -1.20% -1.00% -0.11% -0.07% -4.49% 
20-P Cap 0.22% -0.99% -0.52% 0.19% 0.15% -3.95% 
10% N+P -1.77% -0.84% -6.80% -2.05% -1.50% -2.64% 
10-NP Tax/Trading -1.58% -0.70% -6.27% -1.61% -1.35% -2.44% 
10-NP Cap -1.58% -0.70% -6.27% -1.61% -1.35% -2.44% 
20% N+P -3.23% -1.59% -12.90% -3.52% -2.70% -5.08% 
20-NP Tax/Trading -3.24% -1.59% -12.89% -3.52% -2.70% -5.12% 
20-NP Cap -2.64% -1.08% -12.54% -2.69% -2.17% -4.44% 
Table B.6 Mineral P reductions by subbasin, all P-related scenarios 
Subbasin 04 05 06 10 11 
Scenario 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-3.54% 
-4.31% 
-4.92% 
-3.02% 
-4.17% 
-4.35% 
-4.85% 
-3.71% 
-2.70% 
-4.99% 
-4.09% 
-3.65% 
-4.56% 
-3.59% 
-2.56% 
-3.75% 
-4.50% 
-3.14% 
-4.89% 
-2.63% 
-3.72% 
-3.28% 
-2.69% 
-4.89% 
-2.34% 
-3.60% 
-3.54% 
-3.80% 
-2.87% 
-4.34% 
-4.81% 
-3.08% 
-4.24% 
-2.61% 
-4.81% 
-3.87% 
-3.36% 
-3.70% 
-4.06% 
-2.41% 
-3.15% 
-3.64% 
-2.46% 
-3.69% 
-2.70% 
-3.78% 
-3.31% 
-2.30% 
-5.92% 
-2.15% 
-2.94% 
-3.32% 
-3.89% 
-2.38% 
-3.35% 
-4.17% 
-3.89% 
-3.27% 
-2.22% 
-4.24% 
-4.43% 
-2.79% 
-4.34% 
-3.39% 
-2.10% 
-2.92% 
-3.53% 
-2.46% 
-4.29% 
-2.41% 
-3.43% 
-2.86% 
-2.18% 
-3.55% 
-1.90% 
-7.08% 
-7.43% 
-8.23% 
-5.65% 
-7.87% 
-8.56% 
-7.22% 
-8.21% 
-5.11% 
-8.26% 
-7.72% 
-6.61% 
-7.81% 
-8.65% 
-4.74% 
-7.29% 
-8.34% 
-5.92% 
-8.67% 
-5.18% 
-7.33% 
-6.44% 
-5.07% 
-9.18% 
-4.44% 
-4.53% -2.96% -3.89% -7.53% 
-7.08% 
-7.21% 
-7.55% 
-5.72% 
-7.22% 
-8.87% 
-8.88% 
-8.21% 
-5.37% 
-9.13% 
-8.54% 
-7.23% 
-8.32% 
-8.08% 
-4.89% 
-7.07% 
-7.41% 
-5.60% 
-6.53% 
-5.25% 
-7.38% 
-6.48% 
-4.83% 
-10.14% 
-4.49% 
-7.31% 
-6.27% 
-6.61% 
-7.21% 
-4.97% 
-7.27% 
-7.75% 
-7.27% 
-7.86% 
-4.61% 
-7.51% 
-7.70% 
-6.16% 
-7.27% 
-6.82% 
-4.19% 
-6.47% 
-7.18% 
-5.19% 
-6.83% 
-4.97% 
-7.27% 
-6.02% 
-4.56% 
-8.88% 
-3.95% 
-6.66% 
-4.20% 
-4.07% 
-4.19% 
-3.39% 
-4.86% 
-5.86% 
-5.35% 
-5.74% 
-3.09% 
-5.82% 
-4.71% 
-3.65% 
-4.91% 
-4.79% 
-2.80% 
-4.13% 
-4.94% 
-3.37% 
-5.78% 
-3.12% 
-4.46% 
-3.69% 
-2.98% 
-6.37% 
-2.64% 
-4.26% 
-3.81% 
-4.35% 
-4.92% 
-3.26% 
-4.39% 
-5.93% 
-5.50% 
-4.94% 
-2.90% 
-5.56% 
-4.83% 
-3.27% 
-4.88% 
-4.59% 
-2.64% 
-3.97% 
-4.63% 
-3.10% 
-4.09% 
-3.05% 
-4.41% 
-3.66% 
-2.83% 
-7.11% 
-2.44% 
-4.07% 
-3.81% 
-4.35% 
-4.92% 
-3.26% 
-4.39% 
-5.93% 
-5.50% 
-4.94% 
-2.90% 
-5.56% 
-4.83% 
-3.27% 
-4.88% 
-4.59% 
-2.64% 
-3.97% 
-4.63% 
-3.10% 
-4.09% 
-3.05% 
-4.41% 
-3.66% 
-2.83% 
-7.11% 
-2.44% 
-4.07% 
-8.07% 
-8.61% 
-9.35% 
-6.54% 
-8.99% 
-9.61% 
-9.24% 
-10.15% 
-5.97% 
-10.14% 
-9.41% 
-7.68% 
-9.31% 
-9.08% 
-5.43% 
-8.19% 
-8.93% 
-6.47% 
-10.27% 
-6.03% 
-8.64% 
-7.16% 
-5.77% 
-11.92% 
-5.08% 
-8.78% 
-8.07% 
-8.61% 
-9.35% 
-6.54% 
-8.99% 
-9.61% 
-9.24% 
-10.15% 
-5.97% 
-10.14% 
-9.41% 
-7.68% 
-9.31% 
-9.08% 
-5.43% 
-8.19% 
-8.93% 
-6.47% 
-10.27% 
-6.03% 
-8.64% 
-7.16% 
-5.77% 
-11.92% 
-5.12% 
-8.77% 
-6.98% 
-7.58% 
-8.18% 
-5.68% 
-8.04% 
-9.26% 
-8.33% 
-7.77% 
-5.35% 
-8.94% 
-9.01% 
-7.59% 
-9.21% 
-8.21% 
-4.89% 
-7.12% 
-8.11% 
-5.65% 
-8.42% 
-5.46% 
-7.61% 
-6.69% 
-4.93% 
-8.07% 
-4.44% 
-7.22% 
Minimum -2.34% -2.15% -1.90% -4.44% -4.49% 
Maximum -4.99% -5.92% -4.43% -9.18% -10.14% 
-3.95% -2.64% -2.44% -2.44% -5.08% -5.12% -4.44% 
-8.88% -6.37% -7.11% -7.11% -11.92% -11.92% -9.26% 
10% P Reduction 
10-P Tax/Trading 
Percentage 
Reductions 
Figure B.l Subbasin comparison, 10-P scenarios 
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20% P Reduction 20-P Cap 
20-P Tax/Trading 
Percentage 
Reductions 
-10 to -9% 
-9 to -8% 
-8 to -7% 
-7 to -6% 
-6 to -4% 
Figure B.2 Subbasin comparison, 20-P scenarios 
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10% NP Reduction 10-NP Cap 
10-NP Tax/Trading 
Percentage 
Reductions 
-7 to -6% 
-6 ro -5% 
-5 to -4% 
-4 to -3% 
-3 to -2% 
Figure B.3 Subbasin comparison, 10-NP scenarios 
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20% NP Reduction 20-NP Cap 
i 
20-NP Tax/Trading 
Percentage 
Reductions 
-12 to -11% 
-11 to -10% 
-10 to -9% 
-9 to -7% 
-7 to -5% 
Figure B.4 Subbasin comparison, 20-NP scenarios 
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VERSION ID TRACT SUBTRACT T-TYPE TABLE LINE 
5 01 0 000 00 
TIME 
CONTACT RECORD 
NOTES 
RCODES 
3-COMPLETE 0910 
5-OUTOF SCOPE 
8 - REFUSAL 
9-INAC./INCOMPL 
OPTIONAL 0002 
OPTIONAL 0003 
INTRODUCTION [Introduce yourself, and ask for the operator. Rephrase in your own words.] 
We are collecting information on practices to produce com and need your help to make the information as accurate as possible. 
Akhority for collection of information on the Com Production Practices Report is Title 7. Section 2204 of the U.S. Code. This 
information will be used for economic analysis and to compile and publish estimates for your region and the United States. 
Response to this survey is confidential and voluntary. 
We encourage you to refer to your farm records during the interview. 
BEGINNING TIME 
[MILITARY] 
H H M M 
0004 
BEGTI 
SCREENING BOX 
0006 
SCRN 
[ENUMERATOR NOTE: If Screening box is code 1, 
complete the Screening Supplement 
If Screening box is not coded, begin with Section A.] 
OFFICE USE 
Completion Code 
3 = ZERO TARGET 
0008 
• [Name, address and partners verified and updated if necessary.] 
POID POID 
PARTNER NAME PARTNER NAME 
ADDRESS ADDRESS 
C/7Y STATE ZIP PHONE NUMBER CITY STATE ZIP PHONE NUMBER 
POID POID 
PARTNER NAME PARTNER NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP PHONE NUMBER 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP PHONE NUMBER 
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CORN FIELD SELECTION 
How many acres of corn did this operation plant 
for the 2000 crop year? 
[• If no acres planted, review Screening Survey Information Form. 
Make notes, then go to item 4 of Conclusion.] 
TOTAL 
PLANTED ACRES 
0019 
A0100 
I will follow a simple procedure to make a random selection from the 
corn fields planted for the 2000 crop. 
What is the TOTAL number of com fields 
that were planted on this operation? 
4. Please list these fields according to identifying name/number or describe 
each field. Then I will tell you which field has been selected. 
• [If there are more than 18 fields make sure item 3 is TOTAL fields planted, 
and list only the 18 fields closest to the operator's permanent residence. 
If respondent is unable to identify or describe the fields, use the Field Selection Grid Supplement. ] 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
FIELDS PLANTED 
0020 
A0300 
[If only 1 field, enter 1 
and go to item 5.] 
FIELD NAME, NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION 
1 
FIELD NAME, NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION 
10 
11 
12 
1 3 
1 4 
1 5 ; 
1 6 
1 7 
1 8 
APPLY "RANDOM NUMBER" LABEL HERE 
5. [ENUMERATOR ACTION: 
Circle the pair of numbers on the above label associated with the last numbered field in item 4. 
Select the field according to the number you circled on the label, and record the selected number. 
If only 1 field, enter 1.] 
SELECTED FIELD 
NUMBER 
0021 
A0500 
The field selected is (field namelnumberldescription). 
During this interview, the corn questions will be about this selected corn field. 
[Be sure the operator can identify the selected field.] 
OFFICE USE 
OY Field Substituted 
0022 
A0600 
I l l  
3 
B FIELD CHARACTERISTICS—SELECTED FIELD B 
..-.^ÇRES 
1. How many acres of com did this operation plant I0735 I 
in this field for the 2000 crop? I 5912? I 
CODE 
2. Were the acres in this field- .. 2 rented for CASH? 0736 
B0200 
1 owned by this operation? 
3 SHARE rented? 
4 used RENT-FREE? 
YEAR 
0737 
5. What year did you start operating this field? bosoo 
CODE 
a. Do you EXPECT to be operating this field for the next 5 years 0738 
(through the 2005 crop year)? YES = 1 60530 
YYYYMMDD 
0739 
7. On what date was this field planted? B0700 
UNIT CODES 
for Seeding Rate 
1=POUNDS 
2=CWT. 
4=BUSHELS 
UNITS PER ACRE 25=KERNELS/SEEDS 
10. What was the seeding rate per acre the 
first time this field was seeded? 
0740 0741 
B1001 B1002 
19. Which type of corn seed type was used-
[Sbow Seed Type Code List from Respondent Booklet, and choose one code.) CODE _ 
0743 
a. in this field in 2000? B19a0 
b. in this field in 1999? 744 
[Leave blank if different commodity planted in 1999.] B19b0 
SEED TYPE - CORN 
1 Genetically-modified herbicide resistant seed variety 
2 Non-genetically-modified herbicide resistant seed variety 
3 Genetically-modified Bt variety for insect resistance 
4 Stacked gene variety 
(both genetically-modified insect and herbicide resistance) 
6 Variety planted not described above 
20. [If item 19a is NOT equal 6, ask-] 
Resistant seed varieties offer several benefits. 
Did you choose the resistant seed variety used on this field primarily to-
1 Increase yields through improved pest (weed or insect) control? 
2 Decrease pesticide input costs? 
3 Decrease machinery costs? 
4 Improve ability to use or ease of using reduced tillage or no-till systems? 
5 Improve ability or ease or rotating crops? 
6 Save management time or labor or improve ease of management? 
7 Adopt more environmentally friendly practices? 
For some other reason(s)? [Specify ] 
0745 
CODE 
B2000 
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B FIELD CHARACTERISTICS—SELECTED FIELD B 
21. Has harvest of this field been completed? 
CODE 
0746 
YES = 1 B2100 
22. Now I need information about the acres harvested (or to be harvested) 
and the yields from this field. 
1 
How many acres in the corn field 
were (will be)-
2 3 
What yield UNIT CODES 
didTyouget 2=CWTNDS 
(do you expect 3=TONS 
to get) for— 4=BUSHELS 
ACRES UNrrS PER ACRE 
a. harvested for grain? 0747 0748 0749 B22a1 B22a2 B22a3 
b. harvested for silage or green chop? 
0750 0751 0752 B22b3 
B22b1 B22b2 
c. harvested for seed for planting? 
d. abandoned? 
e. used for some other purpose? 
0753 0754 0755 
B22c1 B22c2 B22c3 
0756 
B22d1 
0757 
B22e1 
1 Alfalfa hay 
11 Hay, all other 
190 Barley 
3 Dry Beans 
85 Canola 
310 Clover 
6 Corn for grain 
5 Corn for silage 
CROP CODE LIST for item 26 
PREVIOUSLY PLANTED CROP was-
196 Tobacco, flue cured 
193 Tobacco, burley 
281 Cotton, Upland 
282 Cotton, Pima 
302 CRP 
311 Grasses other than clover 
94 Mustard 
15 Oats 
31 Sweetpotatoes 
16 Peanuts 
17 Dry Peas 
20 Potatoes 
21 Rice 
22 Rye 
98 Safflower 
25 Sorghum for grain 
24 Sorghum for silage 
26 Soybeans 
28 Sugarbeets 
30 Sunflowers 
142 Vegetables 
163 Wheat, durum 
164 Wheat, other spring 
165 Wheat, winter 
318 No crop planted during this period 
26. Next I need to know what crops were previously PLANTED on this field, including cover crops. 
1 2 
Was this 
What crop was PLANTED on this field in- crop 
irrigated? 
CROP NAME CROP CODE YES - 1 
0758 0759 
a. FALL of 1999? B26a1 B26a2 
0760 0761 
b. SPRING/SUMMER of 1999? .. B26b1 B26b2 
0762 0763 
c. FALL of 1998? B26c1 B26c2 
0764 0765 
d. SPRING/SUMMER of 1998? .. B26d1 B26d2 
0766 0767 
e. FALL of 1997? B26e1 B26e2 
0768 0769 
f. SPRING/SUMMER of 1997? .. B26f1 B26f2 
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B FIELD CHARACTERISTICS—SELECTED FIELD B 
27. In 2000, did your land-use practices 
for this field include-
CODE 
a. terraces? YES = 1 
0770 
B27a1 
In what year 
were the 
(column 1) 
established 
in this field? 
YEAR 
[If (column 1) 
were 
established 
before 
operator began 
operating 
this field, 
enter code 1.] 
3 
In 2000, 
did (or will) the 
Federal or State 
government pay 
an annual rental 
payment for 
keeping this 
conservation 
practice in 
place? 
._|VE:S=t] 
0771 0772 
B27a2 B27aX 
b. temporary or permanent levees? YES = 1 
0773 
B27b1 
0774 0775 
0776 
c. grassed waterways? . . YES -1 B27c1 
d. filter strips or riparian buffers 0780 
on or adjoining the field? .... . . YES = 1 B27d1 
0784 
e. contour farming? . . YES = 1 B27e1 
0785 
f. strip cropping? . YES = 1 B27f1 
g- underground outlets such as 0786 
tile drainage? . YES-1 B27g1 
h. other drainage channels or 0787 
diversions? . YES = 1 B27H1 
B27b2 
B27c2 
B27d2 
B27bX 
0778 0779 
B27cX B27c3 
0782 0783 
B27dX B27d3 
28. Has the Natural Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS) classified any part of this field as "Highly Erodible"? YES = 1 
30. In 2000, did you receive technical assistance for planning, installing, 
maintaining, or using conservation practices or systems on this field? 
(include grassed waterways and filter strips or riparian buffers on or adjoining this field. 
Include assistance from any source whether paid for or free. ) YES = 1 
31. In 2000, did you (or will you) receive cost-sharing or incentive payments for conservation 
practices on this field [Be sure to consider grassed waterways and filter strips or riparian 
buffers on or adjoining this field.]? 
(Include payments received from any source by either the owner or operator. 
Exclude rental payments for keeping the land in these practices.) YES = 1 
CODE 
0788 
I B2800 
0789 
B2900 
0790 
B3000 
0791 
B3100 
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B FIELD CHARACTERISTICS—SELECTED FIELD B 
32. During 2000, did any formal plan of the following types cover this field 
and, if so, in what year was the plan implemented? 
("Formal plan" is a written plan prepared in accordance with Federal, State, or 
Conservation district standards.) CODE YEAR IMPLEMENTED 
0792 0793 
a. Conservation plan specifying practices to reduce soil erosion? ... YES=1 B32a1 B32a2 
b. Comprehensive nutrient management plan specifying practices for 
applying both fertilizer and manure? YES=1 
0794 
B32b1 
0795 
B32b2 
c. Nutrient management plan specifying practices for 
land application of manure only? YES=1 
0796 
B32c1 
0797 
B32c2 
d. Pest management plan specifying pesticide use and/or 
other practices for controlling weeds, insects, or plant disease?... YES=1 
0798 
B32d1 
0799 
B32d2 
e. Irrigation water management plan specifying practices for 
applying or conserving irrigation water? YES=1 
0800 
B32e1 
0801 
B32e2 
33. Was the corn crop on this field covered by 
Crop Insurance in 2000? CODE 
0802 U YES - [Enter code 1 and continue.] YES=I B3300 
• NO - [Go to Section C.J 
If YES, which coverages did you obtain? 
[Enter code for all that apply.] 
a. Basic catastrophic insurance (Federal CAT) bought for a flat fee and 0803 
protects against crop loss greater than 50% of average yield, at 55% of the price. ... YES=I 63330 
b. Buy-up insurance for higher levels of yield and price protection 0804 
(such as 65% of yield and 100% price) YES=1 B33b0 
c. Federal Revenue insurance include Income Protection (IF), 0805 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assurance (RA) YES=I 63300 
d. Other Federal Crop insurance 0806 
(Group Risk Plan, Adjusted Gross Revenue, Group Risk Income Protection, etc.) YES=1 B33d0 
e. Other Private Crop insurance 0807 
(Hail, wind, freeze, etc.) YES=1 B33e0 
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NOTES and CALCULATIONS: 
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FERTILIZER and NUTRIENT APPLICATIONS—SELECTED FIELD 
CODE 
1. Were commercial FERTILIZERS applied to this field ^808 coioo 
for the 2000 corn crop? YES=I 
EDIT TABLE 
0201 
2. [If COMMERCIAL fertilizers were applied, continue, else go to item 7.] 
3. How many trips were made across this field to apply commercial fertilizers for 
the 2000 crop (include applications made by airplanes and commercial applicators)? 
4. Now I need to record information for each application. 
' ~ CHECKLIST 
INCLUDE EXCLUDE 
B Custom applied fertilizers Fertilizer applied in the fall of 
1999 and those applied earlier if 
this field was fallow in 1999 
• Commercially prepared manure 
BMicronutrients Unprocessed manure 
; O Fertilizer applied to previous 
| crops in this field 
NUMBER 
0809 
C0300 
] 
I 
I T-TYPE TABLE 
I 
I 2 001 
| UNE | 99 OFFICE USE UNES IN TABLE 
0213 
2 -» -» -» 
MATERIALS USED 
[Enter percentage analysis or 
actual pounds of plant nutrients 
applied per acre ] 
[Show Common Fertilizers in 
Respondent Booklet.] 
N 
Nitrogen 
0205 
PA 
Phosphate 
0206 
K,0 
Potash 
0207 
What 
quantity 
was 
applied 
per acre? 
[Leave this 
column blank 
if actual 
nutrients 
were 
reported.] 
0208 
4 
[Enter 
material 
code.] 
1 Pounds 
12 Gallons 
19 Pounds 
of actual 
nutrients 
0209 
When was 
this applied? 
11n the fall 
Before seeding 
2 In the spring 
Before seeding 
3 At seeding 
4 After seeding 
0210 
6 
How was this applied? 
1 Broadcast ground without incorporation 
2 Broadcast, ground with incorporation 
3 Broadcast, by air 
4 In seed furrow 
5 In irrigation water 
6 Chisel, injected or knifed in 
7 Banded/Sidedressed in or over row 
6 Foliar or directed spray 
9 Spot treatments 
0211 
How many 
acres were 
treated 
in this 
application? 
ACRES 
0212 
Data entered on this table are in the "CRN00F" file. 
See data dictionary for variable names. 
0205 
0205 
0206 
0206 
0207 0208 
0207 0208 
0209 0210 
0209 0210 
0211 
0211 
0212 
0212 
08 0205 
0206 0207 0208 0209 0210 0211 0212 
T-TYPE TABLE UNE 
0 000 00 
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FERTILIZER and NUTRIENT APPLICATIONS—SELECTED FIELD 
T-TYPE TABLE UNE 
0 000 00 
UNIT CODES 
1=POUNDS 
2=CWT. 
UNITS PER ACRE 4=BUSHELS 
7. What was your yield goal (or expected yield) for this field? 
8. Was a soil test for phosphorus performed on this com 
field in 1999 or 2000 for the 2000 crop? 
a. [If phosphorus test done, ask-] 
How many pounds of phosphorus {per acre) were recommended 
(by the phosphorus test)? 
9. Was a soil test for nitrogen performed on this corn 
field in 1999 or 2000 for the 2000 crop? 
a. [If nitrogen test done, ask-] 
How many pounds of nitrogen (per acre) were recommended 
(by the nitrogen test)? 
0810 0811 
C0701 
0812 
C0702 
CODE 
YES = 1 C0800 
POUNDS PER ACRE 
0813 
C08a0 
CODE 
0814 
YES = 1 C0900 
POUNDS PER ACRE 
0815 
C09a0 
10. [Enumerator Action: Refer to the Fertilizer Table, column 2. 
If nitrogen (N) was applied, complete items 11 and 12. 
If NO nitrogen applied, skip to item 13.] 
11. Was the amount of nitrogen you decided 
to apply to this field based on-
a. Routine practice (operator's own determination based on 
past experience, yield goal, etc.)? 
e. Extension Service recommendation? YES = 1 
f. Cost of nitrogen and/or expected commodity price? YES = 1 
12. Did you use any product to slow the breakdown of nitrogen on this field? 
(For example a nitrification inhibitor such as N-Serve or a urease inhibitor such as Agrolain ) 
13. Was a plant tissue test performed on this field in 1999 or 2000 
for the 2000 com crop? 
CODE 
0816 
. YES = 1 C11a0 
0817 
. YES = 1 C11b0 
0818 
. YES = 1 C11c0 
0819 
. YES = 1 C11d0 
0820 
.   C11e0 
0821 
.   euro 
0822 
YES = 1 C1200 
0823 
YES = 1 C1300 
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C FERTILIZER and NUTRIENT APPLICATIONS—SELECTED FIELD C 
CODE 
0824 
15. Is lime ever applied to this field? YES = 1 cisoo 
a. [If no lime applied, go to item 16-else continue.] YEARS 
0825 
On average, how many years are there between applications of lime to this field? CiSaO 
TONS PER ACRE 
b. How many tons of lime were applied per acre 0826 
the last time it was applied to this field? cisbo 
J ~ CODE 
0827 
16. Was sulfur applied to this field for the 2000 crop? YES = 1 cieoo 
a. [If sulfur applied, ask-] POUNDS PER ACRE 
0828 
How many pounds of sulfur were applied per acre? cifao 
; CODE 
0829 
17. Was gypsum applied to this field for the 2000 crop? YES = 1 C1700 
0830 
18. Were micronutrients applied to this field for the 2000 crop? YES = 1 cisoo 
a. [If micronutrients applied, ask-] 
0831 
Did the micronutrients include zinc? YES = 1 cie*o 
19. Was manure applied to this field for the 2000 com crop? 
(Exclude commercially prepared manure.) CODE 
_ 0832 
• YES - [Enter code 1 and continue.] C1900 
• NO - [Go to Section D.] 
ACRES 
0833 
a. How many acres was manure applied to? ci9ao 
TONS PER ACRE OR TOTAL TONS 
10835 | 0834 
b. What was the total amount of manure applied ) C19b1 I C19bz 
to this field? OR OR 
GALLONS PER ACRE OR TOTAL GALLONS 
0837 0836 
C19b3 C19b4 
MILES 
0838 
c. What is the hauling distance between the manure storage and the manured field? _ci9co 
NUMBER 
0839 
d. How many trips did it take to complete the manure application to the entire field? ci9do 
e. What was the percent of manure applied-? PERCENT 
0840 
(1) in the fall before planting? + ci9ei 
0841 
(2) in the spring before planting? + C19«2 
0842 
(3) after planting? + Ci9e3 
100% 
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C FERTILIZER and NUTRIENT APPLICATIONS—SELECTED FIELD C 
manure-continued 
CODE 
0843 
Was the manure- C19TO 
CODE 
0844 
C19g0 Was the major source 
of the manure from-
CODE 
0845 h. Was the manure- C19h0 
1 Produced on this operation? 
2 Purchased? 
3 Obtained at no cost off this operation? 
Dry Broadcast without incorporation? 
Dry Broadcast with incorporation? 
Liquid Broadcast without incorporation? 
Liquid Broadcast with incorporation? 
Injected/knifed in? 
Beef cattle? 
Dairy cattle? 
Hogs? 
Sheep? 
Poultry? 
Equine? 
Biosolids (muntoipal sludge, food waste, etc.)? 
Other (Specify )? 
20. Were the manure APPLICATION RATES to this field influenced œ46 
by State or local restrictions? YES = 1 C2000 
a. [If YES, ask-] 
What basis was used to determine these manure application rate restrictions- C20a0 
CODE 
0847 (1) Nitrogen requirement of the crop? YES = 1 C20al 
0848 (2) Phosphorus requirement of the crop? YES = 1 C20a2 
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PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS—SELECTED FIELD 
Including both custom applications and applications made by this operation, 
let's list all the chemicals used on this field for the 2000 com crop. 
CODE 
0849 D0100 Were any herbicides, insecticides, fungicides or other chemicals 
used on the com field for the 2000 crop? YES = 1 
[Probe for applications made in the fall of 1999 (and those made earlier if this field was fallow)] 
JlfjTo£estic[des applied, go to Section EJ 
I" 
I Include defoliants, fungicides, herbicides, 
| insecticides and pesticides. 
. Include biological and botanical pesticides. 
Exclude fertilizers reported earlier and 
seed treatments. 
EDIT TABLE 
0301 
3 001 
UNE 
99 
OFFICE USE 
UNES IN TABLE 
0319 
NOTES 
2 
What 
products 
were applied 
to this field? 
[Showproduct 
codes from 
Respondent 
Booklet] 
3 
Was this 
product 
bought in 
liquid or 
dry form? 
[Enter L orD.) 
Was this part 
of a tank mix? 
[If tank mix, 
enter line 
number of 
first product 
in mix.] 
When was 
this applied? 
1 BEFORE planting 
3 AT planting 
4 AFTER planting 
How much 
was applied 
per acre per 
application? 
OR 
What was 
the total 
amount 
applied per 
application 
in this field? 
[Enter unit code.] 
1 Pounds 
12 Gallons 
13 Quarts 
14 Pints 
15 Ounces 
30 Grams 
01 
0305 0306 0307 0308 0309 0310 
0305 
0305 
0305 
0305 
Data entered on this table are in the "CRNOOP" file. 
See data dictionary for variable names. 
0306 
0306 
0306 
0306 
0307 
0307 
0307 
0308 
0308 
0308 
0309 
0309 
0309 
0310 
0310 
0310 
0307 0308 0309 0310 
11 
0305 0306 0307 0308 0309 0310 
12 
0305 0306 0307 0308 0309 0310 
13 
0305 0306 0307 0308 0309 0310 
14 
0305 0306 0307 0308 0309 0310 
2. [For pesticides not listed in Respondent Booklet, specify -] 
LINE Pesticide Type EPA No. or Tradename 
(iHerbicide, Insecticide and Formulation 
Fungicide, etc.) 
Form Purchased Where Purchased 
(Liquid or Dry) [Ask only if EPA No. 
cannot be reported.] 
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D PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS—selected field D 
APPLICATION CODES for column 9 
1 Broadcast, ground without incorporation 6 Chisel/injected or knifed in 
2 Broadcast, ground with incorporation 7 Banded in or over row 
3 Broadcast, by air (Aerial application) 8 Foliar or directed spray 
4 In seed furrow 9 Spot treatment 
5 in Irrigation water 
1 
L 
1 
N 
E 
9 
How was 
this 
product 
applied? 
[Enter code 
from above.] 
10 
How many 
acres in this 
field were 
treated 
with this 
product? 
ACRES 
11 
What was 
the 
number 
of times 
applied? 
NUMBER 
12 
What was the 
PRIMARY target 
pest for this 
application? 
[Show Target Pest 
codes from Respondent 
Booklet] 
13 14 
Prior to this Were these 
application was this applications 
years pest problem- made by-
1 worse than normal? 
3 normal? 1 Operator, Partner, 
5 less than normal? Family member? 
7 unknown? 2 Custom applicator? 
9 not applicable? 3 Employee / Other? 
01 
0311 0312 0313 0314 0315 0316 
02 
03 Data entered on this table are in the "CRN00P" file. 
04 
See data dictionary for variable names. 
05 
06 
07 
0311 0312 
e 
0313 0314 0315 0316 
08 
0311 0312 
* 
0313 0314 0315 0316 
09 
0311 0312 
. 
0313 0314 0315 0316 
10 
0311 0312 
. 
0313 0314 0315 0316 
11 
0311 0312 0313 0314 0315 0316 
12 
3311 0312 0313 0314 0315 0316 
13 
3311 0312 0313 0314 3315 0316 
14 
>311 0312 3313 0314 3315 0316 
T-TYPE TABLE LINE 
0 000 00 
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E PEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES-selected field E 
T-TYPE TABLE UNE 
0 000 00 
1. Now I have some questions about your pest management decisions and practices used on this field 
for the 2000 corn crop. By pests, we mean WEEDS, INSECTS and DISEASES. 
2. Let's begin with questions about scouting this field for pests. 
1 
[If YES, ask-] 
Who did the majority of the scouting for 
[column ?]-
Was this com field scouted for- 1 Operator, Partner or Family member? 2 an Employee? 
3 Farm supply or Chemical dealer? 
4 Independent Crop consultant 
or Commercial scout? 
YES=1 CODE 
a. weeds? 
0850 
E02a1 
0851 
F 9?a5 
b. insects? 
0852 
E02b1 
0854 
E02c1 
0853 
E02b2 
c. diseases? 
5. [If field SCOUTED, ask-] 
CODE 
Were written or electronic records kept for this field to track 0855 
the activity or numbers of weeds, insects or diseases? YES = 1 EOSOO 
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E PEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES--selected field 
6. [Enumerator Action: Were HERBICIDES used {pesticide product 
codes 4000-4999), Section D, item 1 column 2?j 
• YES - [Continue.] • NO - [Go to ffem 9.] 
CODE 
7. Did you apply herbicides to this corn field 0856 
BEFORE weeds emerged? YES-1 EQ70Q„ 
[If item 7 = YES, ask-] 
Did you decide to apply herbicides BEFORE weeds emerged 
on this corn field based on-
0857 
a. a routine treatment for weed problems experienced in previous years? YES = 1 E07a0 
0858 
b. field mapping of previous weed problems? YES = 1 E07b0 
0859 
c. recommendations from a chemical dealer? YES = 1 E07C0 
0880 
d. recommendations from an independent crop consultant ? YES = 1 EOldQ 
8. Did you apply herbicides to this corn field 0861 
AFTER weeds emerged? YES = I EOSOO 
[If item 8 = YES, as*-] 
Did you decide to apply herbicides AFTER weeds emerged 
on the com field based on- CODE 
0862 
a. a routine treatment? YES = 1 EQSaQ.. 
0863 
b. type and/or density of weed(s) present? YES = 1 eosbo 
0864 
c. recommendations from a chemical dealer? YES = 1 EOSCD 
0865 
d. recommendations from an independent crop consultant ? YES = 1 EOSDO 
9. [Enumerator Action: Were INSECTICIDES used {pesticide product codes 1000-2000), 
in Section D, item 1 column 27J 
LI YES • [Continue.] I—I NO - [Go to item 17.] 
10. Did you decide to apply insecticides to this com field based on- CODE 
0866 
a. a preventative schedule? YES = 1 ETOAO 
b. scouting data compared to University or Extension 0867 
guidelines for infestation thresholds? YES = 1 ElObO 
0868 
c. standard practices or history of insect problems? YES = 1 ElOeO 
d. local information {from other farmers, radio, TV, newsletters, etc.) 0869 
that the pest was or was not present? YES = 1 EIMO 
0870 
e. your (the operator's) own determination of the infestation level? YES = 1 ElOeO 
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E PEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES-selected field 
OTHER PEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES CODE 
11. Was protection of beneficial organisms a factor in your 
1 control decisions for this field? YES = 1 
12. Did you apply or release any beneficial organisms to control pests in this field? .. YES=1 
0871 
E1100 
0872 
E1200 
13. Did you use water management practices, such as controlled drainage 0873 
or irrigation scheduling, to control pests in this field? [Exclude chemigation] YES -1 E1300 
14. Did you use tilling, chopping, mowing, burning of field edges, lanes, !0874 
ditches, roadways or fence lines to control pests in this field? YES = 4 E140° 
15. Did you clean equipment and implements after completing 
field work to reduce the spread of pests from this field? YES = 1 
16. Did you cultivate this field for weed control during the growing season? YES = 1 
0875 
E1500 
0876 
E1600 
a. [If YES, ask-] 
How many times did you cultivate this field for weed control 0877 
during the growing season? Ei6a0 
CODE 
17. Did you consider pest resistance when selecting 0878 
which variety to plant in this field? YES -1 E170° 
18. Did you treat the seed used in this field or purchase seed that was 0879 
treated for disease control? YES = 1 EE5L 
0880 
19. Did you adjust planting or harvesting dates to control pests? YES = 1 E1900 
20. Did you use soil analysis to detect the presence of 0881 
soilbome pests or pathogens in this field? YES = 1 E2000 
21. Did you alternate pesticides (use pesticides with different mechanisms of 0882 
action) to keep pests from becoming resistant to pesticides in this field? YES = 1 E2100 
0883 
22. Did you adjust row spacing or plant density to control pests in this field? YES = 1 E2200 
0884 
23. Did you rotate crops on this field during the past 3 years to control pests? YES = 1 E2300 
28. Did you do any other type(s) of pest management 0885 
to control pests in this field? YES = 1 E2800 
a. [If YES, ask-] 
What did you do? [List other activities.] 
0886 
E28a1 
0887 
E28a2 
0888 
E28a3 
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E PEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES-selected field E 
PEST MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
29. [Show Pest Management Information Sources code List.] 
What was your primary outside source of information on pest management 
recommendations for the 2000 corn crop? 
| PEST MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SOURCES 
CODE LIST [Choose one.] 
1 Extension Advisor, Publications or Demonstrations 
(County, Cooperative or University) 
2 Farm Supply or Chemical Dealer [choose one source 
3 Commercial Scouting Service and enter code.] 
0889 
4 Independent Crop Consultant or Pest Control Advisor _ E2900 
5 Other Growers or Producers 
6 Producer Associations, Newsletters or Trade Magazines 
7 Electronic Information Services 
(DTN, internet, World Wide Web, etc.) 
8 Other - (Specify • ) 
9 None - Operator used no outside information source. 
PEST MANAGEMENT TRAINING 
CODE 
30. Have you (the operator) attended any training session on pest identification and o890 
management since October 1,1999? YES = 1 E3000 
OFFICE USE 
0340 ECC 
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F FIELD OPERATIONS — selected field F 
2. Including custom operations, I need to list field work 
performed by machines on this field for the 2000 corn crop. 
Please... 
• Begin with the first field operation after harvest of previous crop, 
(If fallow during 1999, list operations starting with fall 1998.) 
• List the operations in order through seeding, and 
• Maintain the order of tandem hook-ups. 
CODES FOR COLUMN 5 
1 You (The Operator)? 
2 Partner? 
3 Unpaid Worker? 
4 Paid Part-time or Seasonal Worker? 
5 Paid Full-time Worker? 
6 Custom Operator? 
| CHECKLIST 
I Include all field work using machines for-
|Q Land Forming 
[• Tillage 
| Q Preparing for Irrigation before seeding 
|Q Planting 
| Exclude 
|l~l Lime & Gypsum applications 
|f~l Fertilizers & Pesticides applications 
|I~l Operations that occur alter planting 
| l~l Harvesting & Hauling 
L_ , _ l  
J 
2 
s 
E 
Q 
U 
E 
N 
3 
What operation 
or 
equipment 
was used 
on this field? 
4 
[Record machine 
! 5 
Who was the 
machine 
operator-
[Enter code 
from above.J 
[If CUSTOM {column 5 is code 6) 
skip columns 9 & 10.] 
11 
In what month and 
from Respondent 
Booklet.] 
9 10 
How many acres How many acres 
were were 
covered? covered per hour? 
1/ 
operation done? 
E 
NO. CODE ACRES ACRES PER HOUR MM YY 
0351 0352 0353 0357 0358 0359 
0361 0362 0363 0367 0368 0369 
0371 
0381 
0391 
Data entered on this table are in the 'CRN00T" 
See data dictionary for variable names. 
file. 
0401 
0411 
0421 0422 0423 0427 0428 
. 
0429 
0431 0432 0433 0437 0438 . 0439 
0441 0442 0443 0447 0448 0449 
0451 0452 0453 0457 0458 0459 
0461 0462 0463 0467 0468 
. 
0469 
0471 0472 0473 0477 0478 
. 
0479 
0481 5482 0483 0487 0488 
. 
0489 
0491 3492 0493 0497 0498 0499 
1Z For backhoes, disk border maker, ditch doser, ditcher, levee-plow disk, quarter drain machine 
and rear mounted blade, enter total HOURS, not acres. Then leave column 10 blank. 
OFFICE USE 
0032 
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F FIELD OPERATIONS — selected field 
CODE 
8. Was there (will there be) a yield monitor on the equipment 0891 
used to harvest this corn field? YES = 1 F0800 
a. [If YES, ask-] 
Was (will there be) a yield map produced from this harvest 0892 
using information from the yield monitor? YES = 1 F08a0 
(1) [If item 8a is YES, ask~] 
0893 
Was a custom service/consultant hired for this activity? YES = 1 FOSai 
9. Regardless of when done, have the soil properties 
of this field been mapped (by grid or otherwise)? 
[Mapped is intended to mean that a GPS unit was used to geo-reference 0®94 
the location of different soil properties.] YES = 1 F0900 
10. Was this field remotely sensed (by airplane or satellite) and 0895 
an image produced either before or during the 2000 growing season? YES = 1 FIOOO 
a. [If YES, ask-] 
0896 
Was a custom service/consultant hired for this activity? YES = 1 FiOaO 
11. Was variable rate technology (VRT) used for-
0897 
a. fertilization or liming? YES = I FHaO 
(1) [If YES, ask-] 
0898 
Was a custom service/consultant hired for this activity? YES = I FHai 
0899 
b. seeding? YES = I FUbo 
(1) [If YES, ask-] 
0900 
Was a custom service/consultant hired for this activity? YES = 1 Fiibi 
0901 
c. pesticide applications? YES = I FILED 
(1) [If YES, ask-] 
0902 
Was a custom service/consultant hired for this activity? YES = 1 Fllci 
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NOTES and CALCULATIONS: 
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IRRIGATION — selected field 
1. How many acres in this field were irrigated 
for the 2000 corn crop? 
ACRES 
0903 
G0100 
[If field irrigated, continue, if NOT irrigated, go to Section J.] 
2. Now, I have some questions about the irrigation of 
this field for the 2000 com crop. 
a. What type of irrigation system was used to irrigate this field? 
[Show System Type Codes. If more than 1 system used, 
enter Sytem Type Code for system covering the most field acres.] . . . 
SYSTEM TYPE CODE 
0904 
G02a1 
b. What was the total quantity of water applied to this field 
during the entire growing season? 
[Include ALL water used from both on-farm and off-farm sources.] 
INCHES PER ACRE OR TOTAL ACRE FEET 
G02b1 
0906 
G02b3 
TOTAL HOURS 
[If operator cannot provide item 2b, ask-] 
(1) What is the total number of hours that water was applied 
to this field during the growing season? 
10907 
(2) How many gallons per minute were applied? 
What percent of ALL water used to irrigate 
this field came from surface water sources? 
G02b5 I 
GALLONS PER 
MINUTE 
|0908 j 
G02b7 
0909 
PERCENT 
G02c1 
What was the number of times this field 
was irrigated during the growing season? 
0911 
NUMBER 
G02d1 
CODE 
3. Was any water purchased to irrigate this field? 0912 
(Include landlord's share and purchases from all sources.) YES -1 G0300 
a. [If water purchased, ask-] 
What percent of the water used on this field was purchased? 
PERCENT 
0913 
G03a0 
CODE 
9. Were wells used to supply irrigation water for this field? YES = 1 
0914 
G0900 
11. Is the runoff from this 
field primarily-
RUNOFF CODES 
1 retained at the end of the field with no re-use? 
2 re-used to irrigate on the farm? 
3 collected in evaporation ponds on the farm? 
4 drains from the farm? 
5 there is no runoff? 
CODE 
0915 
G1100 
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NOTES and CALCULATIONS: 
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23 
J OPERATOR and OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS J 
1. In 2000, was this operation's 
LEGAL STATUS-
Individual (Sole/family Proprietorship)? 
2 A legal Partnership? 
3 A Family-held Corporation? 
4 A Non-family Corporation? 
5 Other, Including estates, trusts and cooperatives'? 
(Describe 
0035 
CODE 
J0100 
2. In 2000, what was your (the operator's) 
major occupation? 
1 Farm or ranch work 
2 Hired manager 
3 Something else 
Retired 
CODE 
0036 
J0200 
3. What is the highest level of formal 
education you (the operator) have 
completed? 
1 Less than high school 
2 High school diploma or equivalency (GEO) 
3 Some college 
4 Completed 4 year degree (BA or BS) 
5 Graduate school 
0037 
CODE 
J0300 
In what year did you (the operator) begin making day-to-day 
decisions for any farm/ranch? 
YEAR 
0038 
J0400 
5. Now I would like to classify the total acres operated in terms of total gross value of sales. 
Considering- all crops sold, 
> of crops,. poultry, produced under contract, 
What code represents the total gross value c 
• 1 Less than $1,000 
• 2 $ 1,000 - $ 2,499 
• 3 $ 2,500 - $ 4,999 
• 4 $ 5,000 - $ 9,999 
• 5 $ 10,000 - $ 19,999 
• 6 $ 20,000 - $ 24,999 
• 7 $ 25,000 - $ 39,999 
• 8 $ 40,000 - $ 49,999 
• 9 $ 50,000 - $ 99,999 
• 10 $ 100,000 - $ 249,999 
• 11 $ 250,000 - $ 499,999 
• 12 $ 500,000 - $ 999,999 
• 13 $ 1,000,000 and over 
CODE 
0039 
J0500 
6. Of the farm income reported, which of these categories represents the 
largest portion of the gross income from the operation? 
CODE 
040 
J0600 
FARM TYPE CODES 
1 GRAINS and OILSEEDS 8 BEEF CATTLE 
2 TOBACCO 9 DAIRY 
3 COTTON 10 HOGS 
4 VEGETABLES and MELONS 11 SHEEP, GOATS, WOOL and MOHAIR 
5 FRUIT TREE, NUTS and BERRIES 12 EQUINE 
6 NURSERY, GREENHOUSE and 13 POULTRY and EGGS 
FLORICULTURE 14 AQUACULTURE 
7 OTHER CROPS 15 OTHER ANIMALS 
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CONCLUSION 
LOCATION OF SELECTED FIELD 
1. I need to locate the selected field of com 
on this map. 
What county is the selected com field in? 
Field description 
COUNTY NAME 
OFFICE USE 
COUNTY FIPS 
CODE 
0010 Z0100 
2. [ENUMERATOR ACTION: 
Mark map to indicate where the selected com field is located. 
Be sure the "X" marked on map is in county identified above.] 
4. Would you like to receive a copy of the results of this survey in the mail? 
(Results will also be available on the Internet at httD:llwww.usda.aovlnassl ) 
CODE 
YES = 1 0099 Z0400 
RECORDS USE 
5. [Did respondent use farm/ranch records to report-] CODE 
0011 
a. [fertilizerdata?] YES = I zosao 
0012 
b. [pesticidedata?] YES = 1 zosbo 
SUPPLEMENTS USED 
6. [Record the total number of each type of supplement 
used to complete this interview.] 
NUMBER 
FERTILIZER 0041 
APPLICATIONS Z0601 
PESTICIDE 0042 
APPLICATIONS Z0602 
FIELD 0043 
OPERATIONS Z0603 
RESPONDENT 
Respondent's name 
Phone 
1 OPERATOR/MANAGER/PARTNER 
2 SPOUSE 
3 ACCOUNTANT/BOOKKEEPER 
4 OTHER 
CODE 
0101 RESP 
MILITARY TIME 
H H MM 
0005 
ENDING TIME [MILITARY]. 
DATE: 
ENUMERATOR NAME 
ENDTI 
0007 
DATE 
ENUMERATOR ID 
0098 
ENUM 
EVALUATION 
0100 
EVAL 
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